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3. Equal Protection of the Fifth Amendment's Due Proc-
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IV. Conclusion
In recent years, the names of four kinds of conscientious ob-
jectors have been appearing on federal court dockets: (1) religious
pacifists, (2) ethical-humanist pacifists, (3) secular objectors to a
particular war, and (4) religious objectors to a particular war. On
its face, the Selective Service Act seems to exempt only the first
category from military service. In 1965, however, the United States
Supreme Court extended this exemption to persons in the second
category-those who are really secular pacifists although the Su-
preme Court has labelled them "religious." On June 29, 1970, the
Court promised to at least consider whether this exemption should
* The author expresses her appreciation to the Pennsylvania State
University's Liberal Arts Research Office for a research grant for the prep-
aration of this Article.
** A.B., A.M., Ph.D., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Miss Silva
is a Professor of Political Science at the Pennsylvania State University.
be extended to persons in the third category-to non-religious se-
lective objectors. The Court's only response to the religious selec-
tive objector, however, has uniformly been "certiorari denied."
Because the claims of the fourth group were also uniformly
denied in the lower courts until 1969, because these claims are be-
coming more numerous, because at least some district courts are
hearing and even granting them, and because the serious constitu-
tional problems involved have been largely ignored, special atten-
tion should be given to this fourth kind of objector--one whose op-
position to a particular war is based on "religious training and be-
lief." For reasons that will become obvious during the course of
this discussion, an understanding of these constitutional problems
requires some understanding of the evolution of the phrase "reli-
gious training and belief" in American law.
I. "RELIGIOUS TRAINING AND BELIEF"
Prior to 1940, conscription legislation made conscientious-objec-
tor status dependent on membership in a "peace" church and per-
sonal adherence to that church's tenets. The Conscription Act of
1864 granted c.o. status to members of religious denominations
"who shall by oath or affirmation declare that they are conscien-
tiously opposed to the bearing of arms, and who are prohibited from
doing so by the rules and articles of faith and practice of said re-
ligious denominations. .". ."I The Act of 1917 retained these re-
quirements and added the phrase "war in any form."2 Although the
Act's conscientious-objector provision was found not to violate the
first amendment's free exercise or religious establishment clause,3
there has been a progressive secularization of the provision for con-
scientious objection to military service.
The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 dropped the
requirement for church membership and extended conscientious-
objector status to anyone "who, by reason of religious training
and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in
any form."'4 Since passage of this Act, the courts have consist-
1. Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch. 13, § 17, 13 Stat. 9. Persons so exempted
could be drafted for non-combatant service or, in lieu thereof, could pay the
commutation fee of $300.
2. Chapter 15 of the Act of May 18, 1917 gave exemption to members
of "any well-organized religious sect or organization . . . whose existing
creed or principles forbid its members to participate in war in any form
and whose religious convictions are against war. . . ." Act of May 18,
1917, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76 at 78 (emphasis added). Persons so exempted
could be drafted for non-combatant service.
3. United States v. Stephens, 245 F. 956, 962 (D. Del. 1917), aff'd, 247
U.S. 504 (1918) (on the authority of the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S.
366 (1918), in which none of the defendants claimed to be a conscientious
objector so that none had standing to raise the issue). This "authorita-
tive" dictum was supported by neither reason nor citation.
4. Act of Sept. 16, 1940, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 885 at 889. Persons so ex-




ently held that one whose conscientious scruple is based on reli-
gious grounds need not belong to a peace church in order to
qualify under the statute.5 In fact, at least one district court
has said that rejection of a c.o. claim on the ground that the
applicant was not a churchgoer would violate the first and fifth
amendments.' On the other hand, mere affiliation with some paci-
fist sect is insufficient to qualify for exemption since one must also
demonstrate his personal aversion to war.7 Elimination of the re-
quirement for church membership may well be the cause for the
courts' and draft boards' serious difficulty with the phrase "reli-
gious training and belief."
The religious training and belief requirement of the Act of 1940
was interpreted quite differently in the second and ninth circuits.
In the second circuit, in United States v. Kauten,8 Judge Augustus
Hand seemed to hold that an atheist could not qualify under the
statute but added in dictum that the statute exempted any person
whose conscientious scruple against war in any form was "a re-
sponse . . . to an inward mentor, call it conscience or God. . .. "9
Judge Hand reached this conclusion on the theory that the Act of
1940 took "into account the characteristics of a skeptical generation
and [made] the existence of a conscientious scruple against war in
5. United States v. Bowles, 131 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1942), aff'd, 319
U.S. 33 (1943). See also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 171 (1965);
United States v. Owen, 415 F.2d 383, 390 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Berg, 310 F. Supp. 1157, 1161 (S.D. Me. 1970); United States v. Hawley, 310
F. Supp. 929, 936-37 (D. Minn. 1969); United States v. St. Clair, 293 F. Supp.
337, 343 (E.D. N.Y. 1968); United States v. Shacter, 293 F. Supp. 1057, 1060
(D. Md. 1968).
6. Gilliam v. Reeves, 263 F. Supp. 378, 383 (W.D. La. 1966) (appli-
cant's claim to c.o. status was denied on other grounds), vacated on other
grounds, 393 U.S. 51 (1968), aff'd sub nom. Brown v. Resor, 407 F.2d 281
(1969).
7. Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 381 (1955); Bishop v. United
States, 412 F.2d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 1969); Olguin v. United States, 392
F.2d 329, 331 (10th Cir. 1968); United States v. Corless, 280 F.2d 808, 815 (2d
Cir. 1960); United States v. Simmons, 213 F.2d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 1954), rev'd
on other grounds, 348 U.S. 397 (1955).
8. 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943). Since Kauten was an atheist, or ag-
nostic, as well as a selective objector, it is not certain whether his claim for
c.o. status was denied because of his lack of religiosity or because he did
not object to "war in any form." Judge Hand seemed to confuse the two is-
sues and equate conscientious scruple with pacifism and political or
philosophical objection with objection to a particular war. In United States
ex rel. Phillips v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521, 523-25 (2d Cir. 1943), the Court
granted exemption to an ethical-humanist and distinguished this case from
Kauten on the ground that Phillips opposed all wars and violence whereas
Kauten had been a selective objector. For an excellent discussion of these
two cases, see Hunt, Selective Conscientious Objection, 15 CATHOLiC LAwYim
221, 227-29 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Hunt].
9. 133 F.2d at 708.
any form, rather than allegiance to a definite religious group or
creed, the basis of exemption."' 0 This view became the law of the
second circuit in United States ex rel. Reel v. Badt,11 which held
that the statute included an atheist whose opposition to war was
based on philosophical humanism and not on any obligation to a
deity or supernatural power.
The ninth circuit, on the other hand, took the position that the
Act required conscientious objection to be related to belief in a
deity in order to qualify. Berman v. United States12 adopted lan-
guage from Chief Justice Hughes' dissent in United States v. Mac-
intosh13 and defined "religious training and belief" to mean "belief
in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from
any human relation" and expressly excluded "philosophy and mor-
als and social policy without the concept of deity."' 4
In passing the Universal Military and Service Act of 1948, Con-
gress temporarily resolved the difference in favor of the ninth cir-
cuit's view by defining the disputed phrase in the language of Ber-
man: "Religious training and belief ... means an individual's be-
lief in relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to
those arising from any human relation but does not include essen-
tially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely per-
sonal moral code."'15 In dictum, the ninth circuit court interpreted
the Supreme Being clause to mean religion as it has been commonly
and traditionally understood in the United States.'6 Then, in
Clark v. United States,'7 the court upheld the constitutionality of
the statute's distinction between theistic and non-theistic pacifists
and cited its own dictum as authority.
Although the second circuit had also upheld the constitu-
tionality of this distinction,"8 this harmony between the two circuits
collapsed in 1964 when the second circuit held, in United States v.
10. Id.
11. 141 F.2d 845, 847 (2d Cir. 1944).
12. 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946).
13. 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931) (involving a petition for naturaliza-
tion). In a 5:4 decision, the Court held that the applicant's conditional
refusal to promise to bear arms in the defense of the United States unless
he believed the war to be morally just barred him from naturalization un-
der acts of Congress. The case was settled wholly on the basis of statutory
interpretation and has since been overruled by Girouard v. United States,
328 U.S. 61 (1946).
14. 156 F.2d at 381 (interpreting § 5(g) of the Selective Training and
Service Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 885).
15. Act of June 24, 1948, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 604 at 612-13 [hereinafter
referred to as section 6 (j)]. Although the legislative history is cloudy,
Congress' intention to anoint the ninth circuit's interpretation of § 5(g)
(now § 6(j)) seems clear. S. REPT. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 14
(1948). See Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Welsh v. United States,
90 S. Ct. 1782, 1802 n.4, 1803 n.7 (1970).
16. George v. United States, 196 F.2d 445, 450-52 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 344 U.S. 843 (1952).
17. 236 F.2d 13, 23-24 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 882 (1956).
18. United States v. Bendik, 220 F.2d 249, 252 (2d Cir. 1955) (adopting
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Seeger,19 that the statute's limiting c.o. status to persons who be-
lieve in a Supreme Being violates the fifth amendment by creating
an impermissible classification as applied to an agnostic whose
abhorrence of war was sincerely and "religiously" held. While the
Court conceded that Congress may not be constitutionally com-
pelled to provide exemption for conscientious objectors, it argued
that Congress cannot place unconstitutional conditions on the
granting of this exemption. Although Congress may have designed
the statute to accommodate the theistic pacifists' first amendment
right to the free exercise of religion, the Court argued that the first
amendment's establishment clause and the fifth amendment's due
process clause compel neutrality between religions.
20
On appeal, the Supreme Court avoided the constitutional ques-
tion by defining "religious training and belief" broadly enough to
cover Mr. Seeger:
. . . Congress, in using the expression "Supreme Being"
rather than the designation "God," was merely clarifying
the meaning of religious training and belief so as to em-
brace all religions and exclude essentially political, socio-
logical, or philosophical views. We believe that under this
construction, the test of belief "in relation to a Supreme
Being" is whether a given belief that is sincere and mean-
ingful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to
that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly
qualifies for the exemption. Where such beliefs have par-
allel positions in the lives of their respective holders we
cannot say that one is "in relation to a Supreme Being"
and the other is not.
21
The parallel test given by the Supreme Court in Seeger actu-
ally interpreted "religious training and belief" rather than "Su-
preme Being" and, in the process, interpreted the latter phrase out
of the congressional definition of the former. This view seems to
be supported by the Court's statement that the "task is to decide
whether the beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely held
and whether they are, in his own scheme of things, religious.
'22
At the same time, the Court said that the Act of 1948 "excludes
those persons who, disavowing religious belief, decide on the basis
of essentially political, sociological, or economic considerations that
war is wrong and that they will have no part of it."'" The Court
the ninth circuit's position that, since c.o. exemption is a matter of con-
gressional grace, Congress can condition the exemption as Congress sees
fit).
19. 326 F.2d 846, 854 (2d Cir. 1964), afl'd, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
20. 326 F.2d at 851-53.
21. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965).
22. Id. at 185 (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 173 (emphasis added).
failed, however, to supply a criterion for distinguishing between
"political, sociological, or philosophical views" and religious views
in cases where the former play the role of "religion" in the regis-
trant's own scheme of things.
Whatever the ambiguities in the Seeger doctrine, Justice Doug-
las thought that this liberal construction was required to save the
statute from constitutional infirmities on first and fifth amendment
grounds. 24 Speaking for the Court, Justice Clark suggested that
"this construction avoids imputing to Congress an intent to classify
different religious beliefs, exempting some and excluding others,
and is in accord with the well established congressional policy of
equal treatment for those whose opposition to service is grounded
in their religious tenets. '25 Following the Seeger decision, Congress
amended the statute by deleting the "Supreme Being" requirement
and defining what religious training and belief is not: "[T] he term
'religious training and belief' does not include essentially political,
sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral
code."
26
Whatever the congressional intent of the 1967 amendment, the
courts have not interpreted it as limiting Seeger. The implicit as-
sumption has been that by defining what "religious training and
belief" is not, the amendment broadens the definition of what it is
and thus expands the availability of the c.o. exemption. Not only
have the courts consistently held that a registrant cannot be de-
nied c.o. status merely because he does not believe in a Supreme
Being,2 7 but the Seeger parallel test has been used to extend con-
scientious-objector status to an ethical humanist,
28 a pantheist, 29
a professed atheist,3 0 and a registrant whose beliefs were based on
the religions of India.31 In fact, the eighth circuit court has said
that "any type of sincerely held belief opposing war generally
would be difficult to rule out under Seeger ' 32 and that a registrant
is not disqualified from c.o. status merely because some of his belief
may result from logic rather than faith.3 3 Obviously, such broad
definitions of religion have made it difficult for the courts to dis-
24. Id. at 188 (concurring opinion).
25. Id. at 176.
26. Universal Military Training and Service Act, § 6 (j), 62 Stat. 612-13
(1948), as amended by, Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C.A.
§ 456(j) (1968).
27. E.g., Bates v. Commander, 413 F.2d 475, 479 (1st Cir. 1969); United
States v. Prince, 310 F. Supp. 1161, 1165 (S.D. Me. 1970); United States ex
Tel. Morton v. McBee, 310 F. Supp. 328, 332 (N.D. Ill. 1970); United States v.
Shacter, 293 F. Supp. 1057, 1060-62 (D. Md. 1968); United States v. St. Clair,
293 F. Supp. 337, 342-43 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
28. United States v. Vlasits, 422 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1970).
29. United States v. St. Clair, 293 F. Supp. 337, 343 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
30. United States v. Shacter, 293 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Md. 1968).
31. United States v. Prescott, 301 F. Supp. 1116 (D. N.H. 1969).
32. United States v. Levy, 419 F.2d 360, 368 (8th Cir. 1969).
33. Id. at 367-68.
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tinguish religious beliefs from "essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code."
8 4
Following Seeger,35 the lower courts have generally taken the
position that c.o. claims cannot be denied unless it is shown that
political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal
moral code is the sole basis for the claim.86 Furthermore, Seeger
said that if a belief is "religious" it cannot be "a merely personal"
moral code. 7 Consequently, the courts have held that moral and
philosophical opposition to war does not detract from "religious"
opposition to war, 8 that the statute does not distinguish between
externally and internally derived beliefs so that a view need not be
externally derived in order to be "religious" in the statutory sense,8 9
and that peaceful dissent against the Vietnam War does not vitiate
a registrant's "religious" basis for a c.o. claim.40 These cases would
lend support to the conclusion that virtually no sincerely held paci-
fist belief has been ruled out under Seeger.
Also following Seeger, however, a few courts have attempted to
distinguish between religious and secular beliefs and have denied
c.o. status to defendants who consistently maintained that their
34. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
35. In United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), the Court stated:
The . . . words 'merely personal' seems to us to restrict the excep-
tion to a moral code which is not only personal but which is the
sole basis for the registrant's belief and is in no way related to
Supreme Being.
Id. at 186 (emphasis added). It must be remembered that "Supreme
Being" is to be defined in terms of the parallel test. See text accom-
panying notes 21-23 supra.
36. United States v. Vlasits, 422 F.2d 1267, 1268-69 (4th Cir. 1970);
Packard v. Rollins, 422 F.2d 525, 527 (8th Cir. 1970); Pitcher v. Laird, 421
F.2d 1272, 1280 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. White, 421 F.2d 487, 490-91
(5th Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Sheldon v. O'Malley, 420 F.2d 1344,
1349-50 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Levy, 419 F.2d 360, 368 (8th
Cir. 1969); Sertic v. Laird, 418 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Haughton, 413 F.2d 736, 742 (9th Cir 1969); Bates v. Commander, 413 F.2d
475 (1st Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Brooks v. Clifford, 409 F.2d 700,
708 (4th Cir. 1969); Fleming v. United States, 344 F.2d 912, 915-16 (10th
Cir. 1965).
37. 380 U.S. at 186.
38. E.g., United States v. Levy, 419 F.2d 360, 367-68 (8th Cir. 1969);
Bates v. Commander, 413 F.2d 475, 479 (1st Cir. 1969); United States v.
Hawley, 310 F. Supp. 929, 936 (D. Minn. 1969).
39. 'Bates v. Commander, 413 F.2d 475, 480 (lst Cir. 1969) (citing
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 186 (1965) ).
40. United States v. Cummins, 425 F.2d 646, 650 (8th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Haughton, 413 F.2d 736, 742 (9th Cir. 1969); Bates v. Commander,
413 F.2d 475, 479 (1st Cir. 1969); United States v. Pence, 410 F.2d 557 (8th
Cir. 1969); Kessler v. United States, 406 F.2d 151, 155 (5th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Prince, 310 F. Supp. 1161, 1165 (S.D. Me. 1970); United
States v. St. Clair, 293 F. Supp. 337, 344 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). See also Oestereich
v. Selective Service Bd., 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
pacifist beliefs were not derived from any religious training or be-
lief4 1 and to defendants whose pacifist views were found to be es-
sentially political, sociological, or philosophical. 42 In reality, the
parallel test of Seeger has not provided the courts with a work-
able, objective, and predictable standard. Beliefs that are labelled
"religious" in one case seem quite indistinguishable from those that
are held to be "political" or "philosophical" or "a merely personal
moral code" in another case. As two commentators suggest, Seeger
demonstrates that the distinctions between religious beliefs (which
the statute includes) and social, moral, or philosophical beliefs
(which it excludes) are impossible to define in view of the disputes
among modern theologians concerning the nature of religion and
in view of the wide range of beliefs that the courts hold to be "re-
ligious.' ' 43 The distinction becomes even more impossible if theism
is not or cannot constitutionally be the distinctive characteristic of
religion. 44 In short:
Separating one source of belief from another seems princi-
pally an exercise in conceptualism; certainly it is in the
highest degree perplexing. No universally acceptable
41. E.g., United States v. Curry, 410 F.2d 1297, 1299 (1st Cir. 1969);
United States v. Hosmer, 310 F. Supp. 1166, 1170 (S.D. Me. 1970). See
italicized portion of quotation cited in text accompanying note 23 supra.
42. United States v. Morico, 415 F.2d 138, 140-42 (2d Cir. 1969); Calli-
son v. United States, 413 F.2d 133, 137 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v.
McQueary, 408 F.2d 493, 494 (9th Cir. 1969); Vaughn v. United States, 404
F.2d 586, 591-92 (8th Cir. 1968); but all four of the above cases were re-
manded (90 S. Ct. 2230-31 (1970) ) in light of Welsh v. United States, 90 S.
Ct. 1792 (1970) (discussed in text accompanying notes 46-56 infra). See
also Carson v. United States, 411 F.2d 631, 633 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 865 (1969); United States v. Feliciano-Grafals, 309 F. Supp. 1292,
1297-1300 (D. P.R. 1970); United States v. Dale, 304 F. Supp. 1278, 1281
(D. N.H. 1969).
43. Brodie & Southerland, Conscience, the Constitution and the Su-
preme Court: The Riddle of United States v. Seeger, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 306,
326-27 [hereinafter cited as Brodie & Southerland]. During the oral argu-
ment in United States v. Sisson, 90 S. Ct. 2117 (1970), Solicitor General
Erwin N. Griswold admitted that the line between religious beliefs and a
merely personal moral code is "a very thin one" but argued that "it is a
line that Congress can draw." 38 U.S.L.W. 3275 (Jan. 27, 1970).
44. One commentator suggests that there is no rational way to dis-
tinguish between religious beliefs and personal moral codes without
raising constitutional questions. Therefore, he advocates that the Court or
Congress eliminate the distinction and make c.o. status depend solely on
sincerity, strength of belief, and the centrality of the belief in the claim-
ant's hierarchy of values regardless of the religious or non-religious source.
T. Todd, Religious and Conscientious Objection, 21 STAN. L. Rv. 1734-49
(1969). This seems to be precisely what the Supreme Court did in Welsh
v. United States, 90 S. Ct. 1792 (1970). See text accompanying notes 46-55
infra. During World War I, the problem of trying to make this distinction
led President Wilson to issue ExEc. OmER No. 2823 (Mar. 20, 1918) extend-
ing c.o. status to all conscientious objectors without regard to any religious
qualifications. The only test applied was sincerity and good faith. Re-
cently, Solicitor General Griswold conceded that Australia and Great
Britain seem to get along well enough without a religious requirement in
their c.o. schemes. 38 U.S.L.W. 3275 (Jan. 27, 1970). For an analysis of the
Australian system see Reaburn, Conscientious Objection and the Particular
War, 43 Ausm. L.J. 317-29 (1969).
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touchstone is known which enables one to separate religion
from ethics or morals or philosophy, and the search for one
is about as rewarding as efforts to square the circle.
45
In Welsh v. United States, 46 the Supreme Court solved the
problem by eliminating the distinction. Speaking for the Court in
Welsh, Justice Black seemed to define "religion" in the statutory
sense by including what the statute says religion is not. Four jus-
tices held that "if an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs
that are purely ethical or moral in source and content but which
nevertheless impose upon him a duty of conscience to refrain from
participating in any war at any time," he qualifies for a conscien-
tious-objector exemption. 47 This ruling was simply a matter of
statutory construction; the Court did not pass on any constitutional
questions and merely reversed the lower court's decision on the
ground of inconsistency with Seeger.
Although Welsh specifically denied that his pacifism was "re-
ligious" whereas Seeger had been willing to use the term "religious"
to describe his own views if he put it within quotation marks, the
Court argued that Welsh did not understand the term's statutory
meaning as defined in Seeger so that his denial should not be dis-
positive of whether he was entitled to exemption. The Court
stated, however, that a registrant's claim that his pacifism is "reli-
gious" must be given great weight. 48 Obviously, the lower courts
will have great difficulty in finding a non-religious registrant re-
gardless of that registrant's own views about the secular source and
nature of his own pacifism.
In Welsh, the Court said that the statute's definition of what
is not religious should be construed to exclude registrants whose
beliefs are not deeply held.49 Thus, the Court made the objective
nature and content of a belief dependent upon the subjective in-
tensity with which the belief is held so that precisely the same be-
lief might be "religious" in one case and theoretically not "religious"
in another. A lexicographer might suggest that intensity would be
a better test of sincerity than of religiosity. Nevertheless, the stat-
45. Brodie & Southerland, supra note 43, at 308.
46. 90 S. Ct. 1792 (1970). This case arose under the 1948 statute before
the 1967 amendment deleted the "Supreme Being" clause. Universal Mili-
tary Training and Service Act, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 612-13 (1948), as amended
by, Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C.A. § 456(j) (1968).
47. 90 S. Ct. at 1796 (a 5:3 decision with Justice Black speaking for
Justices Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, and himself. Justice Harlan con-
curred in the result. Justices White, Berger, and Stewart dissented, and
Justice Blackmun took no part).
48. Id. at 1797. See text accompanying notes 23 and 41 supra.
49. 90 S. Ct. at 1798.
utory definition of what is not religion seems now to include only
insincere pacifism and pacifism based "solely upon considerations of
policy, pragmatism, or expediency" so that the statute does not ex-
clude registrants "who hold strong beliefs about domestic or for-
eign affairs or even those whose objection is partially founded upon
considerations of public policy." 50  In short, political, sociological,
philosophical, or moral views may be "religious" in the statutory
sense and, if they are, they "cannot be 'essentially political, socio-
logical, or philosophical. .. [or] a merely personal moral code.' ,51
Thus, circular reasoning has squared the circle.
As Seeger defined "Supreme Being" to be a belief "that occu-
pies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the
orthodox belief in God," 52 Welsh defined "religion" as ethical or
moral beliefs that "play the role of religion and function as a reli-
gion in the registrant's life."5 3  Whatever one may think of the
Court's logic and lexicography, the Court in Welsh concluded that
the statute exempts pacifists "whose opposition to war stem[s]
from the registrant's moral, ethical, or religious beliefs .... -54
The Court's strained interpretation, if not distortion, of the
statute may have resulted from an effort to avoid serious consti-
tutional problems. Justice Harlan objected to the Court's distor-
tion of congressional intent but agreed with the Court's result, not
as a matter of statutory construction but as a means of salvaging a
long-standing congressional policy that would otherwise have to
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. Id. (following United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 186 (1965)).
52. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
53. 90 S. Ct. at 1796.
54. Id. (emphasis added) (the phrase "moral, ethical, or religious"
(emphasis added) is also used in 90 S. Ct. at 1798). LOCAL BOIARD MEMO-
RANDUM No. 107, dated July 6, 1970, setting forth the criteria that draft
boards are to follow in order to conform to Welsh, provided that: (1) sin-
cerity is the primary test, (2) solely moral and ethical beliefs are in-
cluded, and (3) the registrant need not believe in a Supreme Being. It
specifically directed the boards not to deny c.o. status on the ground that
the registrant did not belong to a church or that the registrant's beliefs
are "incomprehensible." Finally, the memorandum listed three grounds for
denial: (1) insincerity, (2) selective objection, (3) views based on pragma-
tism, policy, or expediency, 3 S.S.L.R. 11 (5-70). In various cases since
Welsh, the lower courts have granted c.o. status to registrants whose ob-
jection was based wholly on a personal moral code. See, e.g., United
States v. Rink, 430 F.2d 647 (7th Cir. 1970); Aquilino v. Laird, 3 S.S.L.R.
3209 (W.D. Tex.), remanded in light of Welsh, 429 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Coffey, 429 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v.
French, 429 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Lehmann v.
Laird, 3 S.S.L.R. 3207 (4th Cir. 1970); Quinn v. Clifford, 3 S.S.L.R. 3282
(N.D. Cal. 1970); Gresham v. Franklin, 3 S.S.L.R. 3206 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
For examples of cases that the circuit courts have reversed and/or re-
manded in light of Welsh, see Daoust v. Laird, 3 S.S.L.R. 3217 (D.C. Cir.
1970); United States v. Burns, 3 S.S.L.R. 3191 (10th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Eades, 3 S.S.L.R. 3185 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v. Guerrero,




be nullified on constitutional grounds." Similarly, in Seeger, Jus-
tice Douglas had argued that any other construction would be un-
constitutional:
For then those who embraced one religious faith rather
than another would be subject to penalties; and that kind
of discrimination . . would violate the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment. It would also result in a
denial of equal protection by preferring some religions
[theistic ones] over others [non-theistic ones]-an invidi-
ous discrimination that would run afoul of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.56
Several lower courts5 7 and a number of commentators5" have also
thought that the broad interpretation in Seeger was necessary to
avoid constitutional difficulties. Moreover, a number of lower
courts have held that the distinction between religious and secular
pacifism violates the first amendment's establishment clause and
the fifth amendment's due process clause.5 9
55. 90 S. Ct. at 1799, 1803-11 (concurring opinion).
56. 380 U.S. at 188 (concurring opinion).
57. United States v. Gillette, 420 F.2d 298, 299-300 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 90 S. Ct. 2236 (1970); United States v. Levy, 419 F.2d 360, 368
(8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Shields, 416 F.2d 935, 936 (7th Cir. 1969),
petition for cert. filed, 38 U.S.L.W. 3303 (U.S. Feb. 17, 1970) (No. 1040);
Morin v. Grade, 301 F. Supp. 614, 620-21 (W.D. Wis. 1969) (applying the
Seeger doctrine to give c.o. status to an atheist or agnostic since to construe
the statutory language more "narrowly would . . . raise grave questions
of constitutionality under the First and Fifth Amendment"); United States
v. Shacter, 293 F. Supp. 1057, 1060 (D. Md. 1968).
58. E.g., Brodie & Southerland, supra note 43; Macgill, Selective
Conscientious Objection: Divine Will and Legislative Grace, 54 VA. L. REV.
1355 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Macgill]; Mansfield, Conscientious Ob-
jection-1-964 Term, in 1965 RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER at 3 [herein-
after cited as Mansfield]; Rabin, When is a Religious Belief Religious:
United States v. Seeger and the Scope of Free Exercise, 51 COnELL L.Q.
231 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Rabin]; Comment, The Conscientious Ob-
jector and the First Amendment: There but for the Grace of God, 34
U. CH. L. REV. 79 (1966); Comment, Constitutional Law--Nonestablishment
of Religion-Military Selective Service Act of 1967 Unconstitutionally Denies
Exemption to Nonreligious Conscientious Objector to Combat Service in
Vietnam, 83 HARv. L. REV. 453 (1969).
59. Goguen v. Clifford, 304 F. Supp. 958 (D. N.J. 1969); Koster v.
Sharp, 303 F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Pa. 1969); United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp.
902 (D. Mass. 1969), discussed at notes 102-108 and accompanying text infra;
United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964), aff'd, 380 U.S. 163
(1965), discussed at notes 19-25 and accompanying text supra. Both
Goguen and Koster were practicing Roman Catholics. While their pacifist
views are not formally defined dogma which all Catholics must accept, they
were nevertheless the product of "religious training and belief" as defined
in Seeger. See text accompanying notes 78-84, 88-89 infra. In both cases,
however, Catholic priests, in their capacity as military chaplains, had as-
serted that the claimants' interpretations of Scripture and Church docu-
ments were merely personal. See note 61 infra. Consequently, the courts
Since the Supreme Court appears to have eliminated "religious
training and belief" as a criterion for determining eligibility for
exemption, only two criteria remain: (1) sincerity,-i.e., that the
objection be conscientious, and (2) that the objection be to "partici-
pation in war in any form." The ultimate question in conscientious-
objector cases has generally been the registrant's sincerity. Objec-
tive facts are relevant only in so far as they help to determine that
sincerity,60 which is a purely subjective question." Sincerity may
be not only the ultimate question but also the sole criterion after
the Supreme Court hands down its decision in Negre v. Larsen
6 2
and Gillette v. United States.65
II. "IN ANY FoRM"
Prior to 1969, the federal courts uniformly denied the c.o. claims
dealt with Goguen's and Koster's pacifism as though it were a merely
personal, but non-religious, conviction and held that the standard of "re-
ligious training and belief" violated the first and fifth amendments by
making an invidious discrimination between religious and non-religious
scruple. Judge Thomas A. Masterson, in Koster, followed Seeger and held
that Koster's scruple was "religious" and that the administrative finding
was based on the chaplains' narrow and constitutionally impermissible
view of religion. Once the case had been settled on this ground, Judge
Masterson should not have dealt with the constitutional question. Koster
v. Sharp, 303 F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
60. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965); Witmer v. United
States, 348 U.S. 375, 381 (1955); United States v. Leavy, 422 F.2d 1155, 1156
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 1524 (1970); Bishop v. United States, 412
F.2d 1064, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 1969); Kessler v. United States, 406 F.2d 151,
155 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Purvis, 403 F.2d 555, 562-63 (2d Cir.
1968); Olguin v. United States, 392 F.2d 329, 331 (10th Cir. 1968); Parrott v.
United States, 370 F.2d 388, 391-92 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied sub nom.
Lawrence v. United States, 387 U.S. 908 (1967); United States v. Hawley,
310 F. Supp. 929, 933 (D. Minn. 1969); Application of Coryell, 307 F. Supp.
209, 212 (N.D. Cal. 1969); United States v. Warner, 284 F. Supp. 366, 369 (D.
Ariz. 1968).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). A local
draft board's denial of c.o. status is "without basis in fact" if the informa-
tion supplied by the registrant, taken as true, will justify c.o. classifica-
tion and if the registrant's draft file contains no evidence justifying an
inference of insincerity or bad faith. The board's mere disbelief of the
registrant's statements is not enough to deny exemption. Witmer v. United
States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955); Batterson v. United States, 260 F.2d 233 (8th
Cir. 1958); Ashauer v. United States, 217 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1954). A valid
c.o. claim is based on subjective religious beliefs of the registrant and not
on the tenets of the church to which he belongs and need not be supported
by specific scriptural or doctrinal citations. United States v. Brown, 423
F.2d 751, 754 (3d Cir. 1970); United States v. Washington, 392 F.2d 37, 40
(6th Cir. 1968); Olguin v. United States, 392 F.2d 329, 331 (10th Cir. 1968);
Keefer v. United States, 313 F.2d 733, 776-77 (9th Cir. 1963); United States
ex rel. Healy v. Beatty, 300 F. Supp. 843, 848 (S.D. Ga. 1969). See note 59
supra. Failure to be baptized in the registrant's chosen faith is not evi-
dence of insincerity and was held to be no basis in fact for denying a c.o.
claim. United States v. Harris, 302 F. Supp. 1194, 1196 (D. Ore. 1968).
And, the fact that some members of a registrant's family and church had
gone into military service is irrelevant in determining the sincerity of the
registrant's individual beliefs. Kessler v. United States, 406 F.2d 151, 154
(5th Cir. 1969).
62. 418 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. granted, 90 S. Ct. 2256 (1970).
63. 420 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 90 S. Ct. 2236 (1970).
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of selective objectors, whether the objection had a religious,6 4 or a
secular,65 basis. The courts have not, however, required a con-
scientious objector to be an absolute pacifist in order to qualify66
since the statute makes objection to war, not to all force or violence,
the qualification for exemption. Neither a registrant's belief in the
use of force in self-defense6 7 nor his belief in its use to restrain
wrongdoing6" will vitiate his claim for c.o. status. Moreover, the
Supreme Court has held in Sicurella v. United States6 9 that Je-
hovah's Witnesses, who are prepared to fight at the Armagedden or
in a holy war in defense of their faith, are not precluded from
classification as conscientious objectors.7 0
Taking its cue from Taffs v. United States,71 the Supreme Court
argued in Sicurella that willingness to fight in a theocratic war "on
the orders of Jehovah is tempered by the fact that . . . history rec-
64. Carson v. United States, 411 F.2d 631, 633 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 865 (1969) (Carson was a Muslim); United States v. Spiro, 384
F.2d 159, 160-61 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968) (Justices
Black and Douglas dissenting without opinion). It should be noted, how-
ever, that Spiro, a Roman Catholic, was actually a pacifist. See text ac-
companying note 87 infra.
65. United States v. Valentine, 288 F. Supp. 957, 987 (D. P.R. 1968);
United States v. Shermeister, 286 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Wis. 1968) (Shermeister
was a selective objector to the Vietnam War. It is not certain, however,
that he was denied exemption because his objection was selective since the
record shows many factors that indicate a lack of sincerity); Noyd v.
McNamara, 267 F. Supp. 701, 704 nn.5-6 (D. Colo.), aff'd, 378 F.2d 538 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1022 (1967) (Noyd, an in-service objector, had
not exhausted his remedies in the military establishment so that the courts
would not deal with his selective-objector claim for reassignment or release
from the service); United States v. Kurki, 255 F. Supp. 161, 164-65
(E.D. Wis. 1966), af 'd on other grounds, 384 F.2d 905 (7th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 926 (1968); United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 707 (2d
Cir. 1943) (see note 8 supra).
66. United States v. Haughton, 413 F.2d 736, 741-42 (9th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Purvis, 403 F.2d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 1968); Talford v. Sea-
man, 306 F. Supp. 941, 944-45 (D. Md. 1969).
67. Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955); United States v.
James, 417 F.2d 826, 831 (4th Cir. 1969); United States v. Carroll, 398
F.2d 651, 655 (3d Cir. 1968); United States v. Geary, 379 F.2d 915, 920
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 959 (1967); United States v. Shepherd, 217
F.2d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 1954); Jessen v. United States, 212 F.2d 897, 899
(10th Cir. 1954); United States v. Hartman, 209 F.2d 366, 370 (2d Cir. 1954);
Taffs v. United States, 208 F.2d 329, 331 (8th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
928 (1954). Cf., Annot., 99 L. ED. 443, 448-49 (1955).
68. United States v. Haughton, 413 F.2d 736, 741-42 (9th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Purvis, 403 F.2d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v.
St. Clair, 293 F. Supp. 337, 343-44 (E.D. N.Y. 1968).
69. 348 U.S. 385 (1955).
70. Id. at 391.
71. 208 F.2d 329, 331 (8th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 928 (1954)
(statute refers to actual wars and not theoretical, theocratic wars).
ords no such command since Biblical times and their theology does
not . . . contemplate one in the future. '17 2  As one commentator so
aptly put it, Jehovah and the United States Government wage dif-
ferent kinds of wars or, at least, Congress declares war more fre-
quently than Jehovah does so that the Court would not take Je-
hovah's reserved power to declare a holy war into account in decid-
ing actual cases.7 3 The Court's reasoning in Sicurella may have
been a lark or a spoof, but the lower courts have taken the Sicu-
rella holding seriously and have quite uniformly granted c.o. status
to the "theocratic soldier. '7 4 Until United States v. Bowen 5 and
United States v. McFadden76 in 1969, however, the courts have just
as uniformly denied this status to the "just war soldier."
Both Bowen and McFadden were practicing Roman Catholics
and had based their conscientious objection to participation in the
Vietnam War on a Catholic teaching concerning the "just war."
The so-called just-war doctrine is, of course, no monopoly of Catho-
lics but is a teaching of major Protestant churches as well, a fact
that Judge Alfonso J. Zirpoli pointed out in McFadden.7 T Except
for the pacifist sects, Christian churches do not teach a single re-
sponse to war that all members must accept.
The Christian Soldier can appeal to church teaching in support
of his position that military power must sometimes be used to estab-
lish the precondition for justice, order, and freedom.7 8  Moreover,
72. 348 U.S. at 390-91.
73. Macgill, supra note 58, at 1376 n.85. For a discussion of the Su-
preme Court's decisions in the four Jehovah's Witness cases handed down
on March 14, 1955 (Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955); Witmer
v. United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955), and two cases dealing with pro-
cedural matters); see Comment, Conscientious Objectors and Jehovah's
Witnesses, 4 DEPAuL L. 1Ev. 296 (1955).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll, 398 F.2d 651, 655 (3d Cir. 1968);
Kretchet v. United States, 284 F.2d 561, 565 (9th Cir. 1960); Jessen v.
United States, 212 F.2d 897, 899 (10th Cir. 1954); United States v. Hartman,
209 F.2d 366, 370-71 (2d Cir. 1954); Taffs v. United States, 208 F.2d 329, 331
(8th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 928 (1954); United States v. Balder-
ama, 304 F. Supp. 822, 824 (W.D. Tex. 1969); United States v. Gabris, 302 F.
Supp. 235 (E.D. N.Y. 1968); United States v. Nelson, 299 F. Supp. 300, 303
(D. Minn. 1969).
75. 2 S.S.L.R. 3421 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
76. 309 F. Supp. 502 (N.D. Cal. 1970), petition for cert. filed, 39
U.S.L.W. 3074 (U.S. Aug. 25, 1970) (No. 422).
77. 309 F. Supp. at 504 n.5.
78. See, e.g., ST. AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD, Bk. XIX, ch. 7. See also,
Paul Ramsey, Professor of Religion at Princeton, who has developed an ar-
gument for a "just" deterrent strategy and a "just" nuclear war strategy if
deterrence fails but who remains at least theoretically committed to the
just-war doctrine's limitations on the means of warfare, P. RAMSEY, THE
JUST WAR (1968), and his more historical statement of the justification for
Christian participation in War, P. RAMSEY, The Just War According to
St. Augustine, in WAR AND CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE 15-33 (1961); Long, Sup-
port for Conscientious Participation, in WAR AND CONSCIENCE IN AMERICA
21-47 (1968); and Vatican II's Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the
Modern World, § 79:
Those who are pledged to the service of their country as members
of its armed forces should regard themselves as agents of security
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presumably the Christian Soldier applied the criteria for the "just
war" to the facts of a particular war and concluded that the war in
question met these criteria so that he can participate in that war
with good conscience. The Christian pacifist who objects to war
"in any form" is also entitled to appeal to the teachings of his
church that, as a method for settling international disputes, war is
incompatible with the teaching and example of Christ.7 The se-
lective objector can likewise cite church teaching when he argues
that each war must be judged by the just-war criteria so that a
Christian may conclude that a particular war is "unjust" and, there-
fore, that he cannot participate. He is not a pacifist, however, and
would accept the soldier's position concerning the necessity of mili-
tary power.
The just-war doctrine was developed and modified by St. Au-
gustine 0 and St. Thomas Aquinas,"' was further developed in the
Protestant traditions by Hugo Grotius8 2 and various other fathers of
international law, and in the Catholic tradition by the late school-
man, Francisco de Vitoriaj8 and various other Spanish theologians.
While there are many modern versions of the "just-war" teaching,
perhaps their common denominator can be briefly summarized
without serious distortion resulting from over-simplification. In
general, the doctrine distinguishes between the justice of a war (jus
ad bellum) and the just conduct of war (jus in beZlium). The former
relates to the inception of war and requires that the war be de-
clared by a legitimate public authority, that it be waged for defense
or to right a serious injustice, only resorted to after all peaceful
means of settlement have been exhausted and only if there is a rea-
sonable hope of success. Without this hope, the war would simply
aggregate injustice and cause futile suffering. Jus in belium re-
quires that the war be waged discriminately and proscribes various
and freedom on behalf of their people. As long as they fulfill
this role properly, they are making a genuine contribution to the
establishment of peace.
THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II at 293 (Abbott 1966).
79. See, e.g., Long, Religious Opposition to Participation in War, in
WAR AND CONSCIENCE IN AMERICA 48-75 (1968); MAYER, THE PACmST
CONSCIENCE (1966); ORR, CHRISTIAN PACIFISM (1958). Even among mem-
bers of traditional peace churches, there are those who decline to say
categorically that they would never fight in extraordinary circumstances to
prevent a greater evil and think it presumptuous to make such a univer-
sal assertion. Friedman, Covenant of Peace, PENDLE HILL PAMPHLET No.
110 at 17 (1960).
80. ST. AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD, Bk. XIX, ch. 7, Bk. IV, chs. 14 & 15;
CONTRA FAUSUM, I, XXII, ch. 74.
81. SUMMA THEOLOGICA, II-II, Q. 40.
82. DE JuRE BELLI Ac PACIS (1625).
83. DE JuRn BELLI (1532).
"unjust" means such as torturing or killing prisoners, indiscrimi-
nate destruction, attack on civilian populations, and similar mea-
sures, many of which have also been proscribed by international
law or treaty. Integral to the just-war doctrine is the principle of
proportionality, which requires that the good accomplished by the
war must exceed the evil caused by that war.8 4 Although the just-
war doctrine is a teaching of major Christian churches, it should be
remembered that even non-pacifist traditions of Judaism also dis-
tinguish between wars and have criteria restricting the uses of vio-
lence. A Jew, therefore, could likewise appeal to his religious tra-
dition in support of his objection to a particular war or to partici-
pating in certain religiously proscribed activities in an otherwise
justifiable war. 5
In modern times, churches do not normally label wars as "just"
or "unjust." Presumably, however, a thoughtful, religious person
could take the criteria supplied to him by his religious tradition,
apply these criteria to the facts of a particular war, and conclude
that the war was "unjust" so that he could not participate. This is
what was done by two Roman Catholics, Bowen and McFadden.8 6
He might even conclude that no modern war can meet the criteria
of a just war since, among other things, no belligerent can reason-
ably hope for military success in modern warfare without resort-
ing to "unjust" means. If he conscientiously reaches this conclu-
sion, he might still admit the theoretical possibility of a "just" war
but would be a pacifist for all practical purposes. This was the posi-
tion taken by two other Roman Catholics, Berg and Spiro.8 7 From a
84. Various authors list a different number of traditional criteria
depending largely on how the particular author divides them, e.g., R.
POrER, WAR AND MORAL DISCOURSE 43-44 (1969) (listing 8); Potter's biblio-
graphic essay on the development of western thought concerning the cri-
teria of the just war, id. at 87-95; J. McKenna, Ethics and War: A Catholic
View, 54 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 647, 651-52 (1960) (listing 7). A good biblio-
graphy on the just-war doctrine's application to the Vietnam War can
be found in Smylie's footnotes, Smylie, American Religious Bodies, Just
War, and Vietnam, 11 J. OF CHURCH & STATE 383-404 (1969). See also, P.
Ramsey, The Just War in Contemporary American Protestant Thought, in
WAR AND CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE 134-70 (1961); Pastoral Constitution on the
Church in the Modern World, §§ 79-82, in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II
at 291-97 (Abbot 1966); TUCKER, JUST WAR AND VATICAN CouNcm H: A
CRITIQUE (1966); TUCKER, THE JUST WAR (1960) (an interesting study of
the modern American, secular doctrine that focuses largely on the justice
of defensive war and mutual security often at the expense of jus in bellum
concerning proportionality and indiscriminate destruction). 1
85. Gendler, War and the Jewish Tradition, in A CONFLICT OF LOYAL-
TIES: THE CASE FOR SELECTIVE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 78-102 (Finn. ed.
1968).
86. See notes 75 and 76 and accompanying text supra.
87. United States v. Berg, 310 F. Supp. 1157 (S.D. Me. 1970); United
States v. Spiro, 384 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956
(1968). Stephen Spiro contended that "there never had been a just war in
history and there never could be." Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 8a-9a,
United States v. Spiro, 390 U.S. 956 (1968). The just-war doctrine's adher-
ents take a variety of positions on what the doctrine means in the modern
world. See, e.g., RYAN, MODERN WAR AND BASIC ETHICS (1940); NUCLEAR
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religious point of view, it is no argument to say that these men's
conclusions are mistaken since their Church teaches that it is always
sinful to violate conscience even if the content of conscience is
erroneous,8 8 a doctrine also taught by various other Christian
churches.
8 9
The secular rationale for selective objection, the so-called Nur-
emberg principles, is similar in content to the just-war doctrine.
The secular rationale, however, lacks the just-war doctrine's theo-
logical assumptions and implications. The Charter of the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal, which provided for the "war crimes trials"
after the Second World War, established "crimes against peace,"
"war crimes," and "crimes against humanity." 90  The first is analo-
gous to the just-war doctrine's jus ad bellum and relates to planning
and initiating aggressive war. The latter two are analogous to jus
in bellum, incorporate the limitations contained in various interna-
tional agreements, and include rules protecting prisoners of war
and civilian populations as well as rules limiting the means of war-
fare.91 In general, these crimes are more precisely defined but less
WEAPONS: A CATHOLIC RESPONSE (Stein ed. 1961) (taking the position that
there can be no just war). But see Murray, War and Conscience, in A
CONFLICT OF LOYALTIES: THE CASE FOR SELECTnV OBJECTION 19, 23 (Finn ed.
1968).
88. Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, § 16,
THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II at 213-14 (Abbot 1966); Declaration on Re-
ligious Freedom, § 3, para. 3, id. at 681.
89. Representatives of Jews, Baptists, Lutherans, Presbyterians, Qua-
kers, Disciples of Christ, United Church of Christ, Reformed Church in
America, and the National Council of Churches filed amiqus curiae briefs
in United States v. McFadden, 309 F. Supp. (N.D. Cal. 1970), and Judge
Zirpoli noted that these briefs indicate that various religions have doctrines
on the binding character of conscience similar to this Roman Catholic teach-
ing. Id. at 504 n.5. See the compilation of the statements of more than
fifty religious bodies in the United States supporting conscientious objection
contained in NAT'L INTERRELIGIOUS SERVICE BOARD FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OB-
JECTORs, RELIGIOUS STATEMENTS ON CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION (7th ed.
1970) [hereinafter cited as NAT'L INTERRELICIOUS SERV. BD.], esp. the strong
statements supporting selective conscientious objection issued by the Lu-
therans (Lutheran Church in America and Missouri Synod), id. at 43-45;
National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., id. at 54; United Pres-
byterians, id. at 57; United Church of Christ, id. at 66-68. See also the pas-
toral letter of the AMERICAN [ROMAN CATHOLIC] HIERARCHY, HUMAN LIFE IN
OUR DAY 41-45 (Nov. 15, 1968); U.S. CATHOLIC CONF., STATEMENT ON THE
CATHOLIC CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR (Oct. 15, 1969); and the report on the
World Council of Churches (Upsala 1968), N.Y. Times, July 17, 1968, at 1,
col. 1.
90. 59 Stat. 1546-52, art. 6 (1945).
91. The most widely discussed prohibitions are those against: (1) the
intentional killing, injuring, or attacking the rights of noncombatants;
(2) attacks on "non-military" targets; (3) "indiscriminate" means of war-
fare which, by their nature, cause indiscriminate damage in populated areas
or which "knock out" large areas where significant numbers of non-
combatants are known to be present, e.g., "saturation bombing"; (4) the
use of weapons that cause "superfluous suffering" such as dumdum bullets,
17
numerous than the acts of war proscribed by most modern versions
of the just-war doctrine.92 The Nuremberg principles also provide
that "acts of state" and "superior orders" cannot be used as de-
fenses by one accused of these so-called crimes.98
The "Nuremberg objector" argues that these rules are con-
tained in treaties and conventional international law to which the
United States adheres, that these rules are the "supreme law of the
land" under article VI of the Constitution, that they are being vio-
lated in a particular conflict such as the Vietnam War, that he could
very well be forced to participate directly in these violations, that
he has scruples about being a "war criminal" and, therefore, that he
refuses to serve in the armed forces.9 4 The Nuremberg argument
suggests that there are moral considerations that transcend the
citizen's loyalty to the state and that this morality has no necessary
connection to a religious faith although there may be a connection
in some individual cases.
It seems certain that the federal courts will not inquire into
the question of whether military activities in a particular war vio-
late domestic or international law since this is a political ques-
tion.95 Moreover, defendants have been unable to raise the al-
the so-called "St. Petersburg principle" of 1899; (5) "the use ... of
asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials
or devices" as well as "the use of bacteriological methods of warfare," the
Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925; (6) the "wanton destruction of cities, towns
or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity," as provided
by § 6(b) of the London Charter of 1945, 59 Stat. 1546-52 (1945). O'Brien,
The Nuremberg Principles in A CONFLICT OF LOYALTIES: THE CASE FOR
SELECTIVE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION 140, 166-67 (Finn ed. 1968) [hereinafter
cited as O'Brien I].
92. See O'Brien, Selective Conscientious Objection and International
Law, 56 GEo. L.J. 1080, 1111, 1112-19 (1968) (O'Brien enumerates the prin-
ciples governing illegal means of war but questions whether they are still
binding) [hereinafter cited as O'Brien II].
93. 59 Stat. 1546-52, arts. 7-8 (1945); The Nuremberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69,
110-11 (1946) (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) ); Dorsen &
Rudovsky, Some Thoughts on Dissent, Personal Liberty, and War, 54
A.B.A.J. 752, 756 (1968).
94. See, O'Brien II, supra note 92, at 1125. O'Brien, who has made
the most authoritative study of this subject, concludes: (1) The claim that
a war is illegal under international law ["crimes against peace"] so that
a participant risks treatment as a "war criminal" has little merit in either
international or domestic law; (2) Objections to allegedly illegal military,
political, and other policies not directly involving the soldier are largely
irrelevant to selective c.o. claims since they are the legal responsibility of
high decision-makers who assume their positions voluntarily; (3) "War
crimes" and "crimes against humanity" are relevant, but the meaning and
present validity of each rule must be carefully considered in the light of
the present practice of states and in the light of its feasibility in modern
civil-international warfare before giving a rule serious consideration in
selective c.o. claims; (4) The usage of belligerents simply does not conform
to conventional international law so that the most definite laws of war
are widely violated, e.g., denial of quarter, torture to obtain intelligence,
overly broad interpretation of "military necessity" to destroy populated
towns, reprisals against civilian populations, execution of hostages, etc.;
(5) Many of the most controversial methods, e.g., use of napalm, are not
The Conscientious Objector
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
leged illegality of the Vietnam War under international law as a
defense to prosecution for failure to submit to induction into the
armed forces,90 or to raise the question after induction,97 or to raise
it in an action to prevent themselves from being sent to Vietnam s8
This does not mean, however, that a "Nuremberg objector" may not
be granted a conscientious-objector exemption. Three such objec-
tors have succeeded in getting their cases on the Supreme Court
docket.
expressly covered by international law so that objection to these means
must be primarily moral and humanitarian rather than legal; (6) The
more persuasive c.o. claim would be that all modern warfare exceeds per-
missible legal and moral limits rather than a particular war exceeds those
limits (this is essentially the position of the "just war" pacifist, see text
accompanying note 87 supra). O'Brien I, supra note 91, at 183-84; O'Brien
II, supra note 92, at 1126-27. See also Farer, Petrowski, Forman, et al.,
The Nuremberg Trials and Objection to Service in the Vietnam War, 63
PROCEEDINGS AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 140-81 (1969); D'Amato, Gould, & Woods,
War Crimes and Vietnam: The "Nuremberg Defense" and the Military
Service Resister, 57 CAL. L. REv. 1055-1110 (1969).
95. Mora v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
934 (1967) (But see the dissent of Justices Stewart and Douglas, 389 U.S. at
934-39); United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 511, 515, 520 (D. Mass. 1968),
appeal dismissed, 90 S. Ct. 2117 (1970) (see note 103 infra); United States v.
Valentine, 288 F. Supp. 957, 984-87 (D. P.R. 1968); Luftig v. McNamara, 252
F. Supp. 819, 820-21 (D. D.C. 1966), afj'd, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967). But see Berk v. Laird, 3 S.S.L.R. 3142 (2d Cir.
1970); Orlando v. Laird, 3 S.S.L.R. 3144 (E.D. N.Y. 1970); Mattola v. Nixon,
3 S.S.L.R. 3312 (N.D. Cal. 1970). The late Carl B. Swisher argued that Con-
gress had declared war sub silentio, "a constructive declaration of war," by
enacting appropriations and other measures to support the war and that
these statutes take precedence over prior treaties so that the question is
moral rather than legal. C. Swisher, The Supreme Court and Conscrip-
tion, in 54 CURRFNT HISTORY 351 at 365 (1968).
96. United States v. Gillette, 420 F.2d 298, 299 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,
90 S. Ct. 2236 (1970); Smith v. United States, 3 S.S.L.R. 3058 (9th Cir.
1970); Rusk v. United States, 419 F.2d 133, 136 (9th Cir. 1969); United States
v. Rehfield, 416 F.2d 273, 275 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, -U.S. -
(1970); United States v. Owens, 415 F.2d 1308, 1316 (6th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 90 S. Ct. 1138 (1970); Kemp v. United States, 415 F.2d 1185, 1188
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 1008 (1970); United States v. Pratt,
412 F.2d 426, 427 (6th Cir. 1969), petition for cert. filed, 38 U.S.L.W. 3213
(U.S. Dec. 9, 1969) (No. 666); Simmons v. United States, 406 F.2d 456, 460
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 982 (1969); United States v. Prince, 398
F.2d 686 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 946 (1968); United States v.
Mitchell, 246 F. Supp. 874, 898-99 (D. Conn. 1965), aff'd, 392 F.2d 214 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 972 (1967). (But see Justice Douglas' dissent
raising questions that he thought the Court should consider, 386 U.S. at
972-74); United States v. St. Clair, 291 F. Supp. 122, 125 (S.D. N.Y. 1968);
United States v. Valentine, 288 F. Supp. 957, 983 (D. P.R. 1968).
97. Lufting v. McNamara, 252 F. Supp. 819 (D. D.C. 1966), aff'd, 373
F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967).
98. Negre v. Larsen, 418 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. granted, 90
S. Ct. 2256 (1970); Mora v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 389 U.S. 934 (1967).
On June 29, 1970, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Gillette v. United States90 and Negre v. Larsen,10 0 "in
order to consider the 'selective' conscientious objector issue,"''1 1
which underlay United States v. Sisson'02 but which the Court did
not reach in Sisson for lack of jurisdiction. 10 In the district court,
Judge Charles Wyzanski held that Sisson's first amendment right
to the free exercise of religion must prevail over the Government's
power to compel his service in Vietnam. 10 4 At least this is true,
in Judge Wyzanski's opinion, as long as the Selective Service Act
exempts pacifists from combatant training and duty10 5 While
Judge Wyzanski found that the requirements for "religious training
and belief" and opposition to war "in any form" were constitution-
ally infirm, he suggested, but did not rule, that the first amend-
ment's free exercise clause may require provision for conscientious
objection when the United States is not in an all-out war or when its
shores have not been invaded.' 06
Whether conscientious objection be a first amendment right
or a privilege granted by Congress, Judge Wyzanski was certain
that the first amendment's prohibition against religious establish-
ment requires that the conscientious-objector right or privilege be
extended to persons like Sisson who are not absolute pacifists but
who conscientiously object to participation in a particular war-in
Sisson's case the Vietnam War. 1 7 Judge Wyzanski contended that
failure to make this extension would mean that the Act discrimi-
nates in favor of certain types of religious objectors to the prejudice
of Sisson. He specifically noted that the Act would also favor
Quakers and other pacifists over Roman Catholic just-war objectors
as well as over other selective objectors like Sisson, who never
claimed to be a religious objector. 08
Not only was Sisson not a religious objector, but he had never
applied for and would not accept conscientious objector status. In-
99. 90 S. Ct. 2236 (1970).
100. Id. at 2256.
101, Id. at 2120 n.1.
102. 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969).
103. 90 S. Ct. at 2117 (1970). The jury had convicted Sisson for re-
fusal to submit to induction into the armed forces, but Judge Charles
Wyzanski arrested judgment on the ground that Sisson could not be crim-
inally convicted because the conscientious objector provision of the Military
Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C.A. § 456(j) (1968), violated the
free exercise and religious establishment clauses of the first amendment and
the due process clause of the fifth. See text accompanying note 102 supra.
Speaking for the Court, Justice Harlan held that Judge Wyzanski's action
amounted to "directed acquittal" and was not "arrest of judgment" so that
the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction under the Criminal Appeals Act, 18
U.S.C.A. § 3731 (1969). Thus, the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdic-
tion with Justices Burger, Douglas, and White dissenting. 90 S. Ct. at 2139.
104. 297 F. Supp. at 910.
105. Id. at 911.
106. Id. at 906-10.




stead of arguing that his beliefs were based on religious training
and belief, Sisson contended that the Vietnam War was illegal under
domestic and international law and that his beliefs were reasonable
so that he lacked the requisite intent to "willfully" refuse induction.
Judge Wyzanski, therefore, actually went beyond the face of the rec-
ord in reaching his decision but did so without passing on the
validity of Sisson's beliefs.
If the Supreme Court actually gets to the merits of Gillette's
and Negre's Nuremberg claims for selective objection, the Court
may well follow Seeger and Welsh and interpret the statute to grant
c.o. status to the petitioners. The statute requires that one be con-
scientiously opposed to "participation in war in any form." 10 9
Two courts have already held that "in any form" relates to "par-
ticipation" and not to "war" 110 so that the Court could hold
that the test is not opposition to all war but opposition to any
form of participation in a particular war."' Moreover, the courts
have repeatedly held that one need not be a complete pacifist to
qualify for exemption under the statute.11 2 The "parallel test"
used in Seeger to stretch "religious training and belief" could also
be developed in connection with "war in any form" so that c.o.
status could be granted to the selective objector. Should the Su-
preme Court apply this reasoning, it might well speak as follows:
We believe that the test for exemption is whether a
given belief-the just-war doctrine or the Nuremberg
principles-occupies a place in the life of its possessor par-
allel to that filled by pacifist beliefs in the life of one who
clearly qualifies for exemption. Where such beliefs have
109. Universal Military Training and Service Act, § 6(j), 62 Stat.
612-13 (1948), as amended by Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50
U.S.C.A. § 456(j) (1968).
110. United States v. Hartman, 209 F.2d 366, 371 (2d Cir. 1954); Taffs
v. United States, 208 F.2d 329, 331 (8th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
928 (1954). This position can be supported by cases denying the exemp-
tion to registrants who have worked in defense factories or who have said
that they would contribute to the defense effort in a non-combatant role.
Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 382 (1955); DeRemer v. United
States, 340 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1963), aff'g, 221 F. Supp. 553 (D. Minn. 1965);
United States v. Moore, 217 F.2d 428 (7th Cir. 1954), rev'd on other grounds,
348 U.S. 966 (1955); Robertson v. United States, 208 F.2d 166 (10th Cir.
1953). If such indirect participation can preclude exemption, the phrase in
any form must modify participation rather than war.
111. Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 386, 390 (1955). One commen-
tator, Hunt, supra note 8, argues that the Selective Service System's rules
against selective objectors is not supported by legal authority and was
rejected by the Court in Sicurella, which said: "The test is not whether
the registrant is opposed to all war, but whether he is opposed, on religious
grounds, to participation in war." Id. (Court's emphasis). For Hunt's
argument that the statute does not require objection to all wars for ex-
emption, see Hunt, supra note 8, at 221-37.
112. See text accompanying notes 66-74 supra.
parallel positions in the lives of their respective holders, we
cannot say that one is "religious" and the other is not. We
have concluded that the beliefs of the selective objectors in
these cases meet these criteria. Cf. United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965).1-13
To construe the statute otherwise would discriminate
in favor of one religion as against another so that this Court
must construe the statute to avoid this constitutional in-
firmity. Cf. United States v. Carson, 282 F. Supp. 261,
268-69 (E.D. Ark. 1968). This construction avoids imputing
to Congress an intent to classify religious beliefs, exempting
some and excluding others, and is in accord with the well-
established congressional policy of equal treatment for
those whose opposition to service is grounded in their re-
ligious tenets. Cf. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176.
If the Supreme Court were confronted with Bowen or McFad-
den rather than Negre and Gillette, this interpretation of the stat-
ute might seem less strained since the claims of the former are
clearly predicated on religious beliefs. At least Judge Zirpoli must
have thought so since he anointed McFadden's claim'1 4 and de-
nied Negre's.115 Since Seeger and Welsh, however, there may be
no real legal difference between the selective claims of Bowen and
McFadden on the one hand and those of Negre and Gillette on the
other so that the court might well add a morsel of dictum in its
opinion upholding the claims of the latter:
A Catholic or a Methodist or a Lutheran or a Presby-
terian who concludes that a particular war does not satisfy
the conditions of his church's just-war doctrine is a relig-
ious objector quite as much as a Quaker or a Seventh Day
Adventist. The doctrine requires believers to pass judg-
ment on a war before participating in it. Therefore, if a
member of one of these denominations applies the doc-
trine's criteria to the facts of a particular war and con-
scientiously concludes that he cannot participate in it, his
claim for exemption from military service would have a re-
113. See also Note, Admission to the Bar Following Conviction for
Refusal of Induction, 78 YALE L.J. 1352, 1375 (1969).
114. United States v. McFadden, 309 F. Supp. 502 (N.D. Cal. 1970), pe-
tition for cert. filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3074 (U.S. Aug. 25, 1970) (No. 422) (hold-
ing that the statute exempting pacifists placed such a burden upon the re-
ligious beliefs of a Roman Catholic selective objector as to violate the first
amendment's free exercise clause).
115. Negre v. Larsen, 418 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. granted, 90
S. Ct. 2256 (1970) (holding that the Army had basis in fact for denying
Negre's release from the Army on c.o. grounds since: (1) Negre's objec-
tion resulted from a personal moral code based on sociological and philoso-
phical views, and (2) Negre's objection was to the Vietnam War rather
than to all wars). One might suspect that the court's first basis for deci-
sion has been vitiated by Welsh, see text accompanying notes 46-55 supra.
The Negre court expressly rejected Judge Wyzanski's decision in Sisson,
saying: "We believe that Sisson was wrongly decided and decline to follow
it." 418 F.2d at 910. Although Negre's claim was denied on the ground
that his views were merely personal and not based on religious training and
belief, Negre, a Roman Catholic, is now also basing his claim on the "just




ligious basis, which would not be vitiated by the mere fact
that his decision may involve some political, sociological,
philosophical, or moral considerations. Nor are they vi-
tiated by the fact that his judgments are personal. Cf.
Welsh v. United States, 90 S. Ct. 1792, 1798 (1970).116
Since Congress and/or the courts have given c.o. status to Je-
hovah's Witnesses, the first amendment's establishment clause
would seem to preclude denying it to others who also believe in the
use of force when approved by God in a "just war." In filling out
conscientious objector forms, Jehovah's Witnesses usually say that
they would use force in self-defense and in defense of family, home,
the brethren, their ministry, and the faith. Therefore, granting ex-
emption to a Witness would seem to require at least the granting of
it to the just-war objector who argues that there can be no just war
under conditions of modern warfare so that the possibility of a just
war is an historical and a highly theoretical proposition to him.
117
Not only do the just-war objectors' claims seem as reasonable as
those of Jehovah's Witnesses, but they also appear to be as reason-
able as Seeger's and Welsh's claims, which apparently were under-
stood only by the Supreme Court and Paul Tillich.11
One merit of Tillich's and the Court's definitions of religion is
that they virtually eliminate the statute's distinction between re-
ligious and non-religious beliefs and, thereby, cut the courts loose
116. In this hypothetical dictum, the Court might also cite Macgill,
supra note 58, at 1376-77.
117. This was the case with United States v. Spiro, 384 F.2d 159 (3d
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968). See note 87 and accompanying
text supra. The court in Spiro simply declined to deal with his contention
that granting c.o. status to Jehovah's Witnesses who will fight only in a
theocratic war while denying it to a Catholic who will fight only in a
"just war" violates the first and fifth amendments. In United States v.
Berg, 310 F. Supp. 1157 (S.D. Me. 1970), however, Judge Edward T. Gig-
noux ruled that one who holds such just-war views is actually opposed to
war "in any form" and can qualify for exemption under the statute.
At least some of Jehovah's Witnesses expressly state that they would
fight in actual wars if so ordered by Jehovah. See, e.g., Kretchet v. United
States, 284 F.2d 561, 563-66 (9th Cir. 1960); United States v. Stankewicz, 124
F. Supp. 27 (W.D. Pa. 1954). See also, Why Jehovah's Witnesses are not
Pacifists, WATCHTOWE_, Feb. 1, 1951, at 67. Moreover, Kretchet expressly
said that an earthly mortal might be Jehovah's instrument in declaring
the holy war, 284 F.2d at 564, so that such a war may not be so unlikely as
the Supreme Court suggested in Sicurella (quoted in text accompanying
note 72 supra).
118. P. TILLICH, II SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 12 (1957), which the Court in
Seeger quoted approvingly, 380 U.S. at 180; P. TILLICH, THE SHAKING OF
THE FOUNDATION 57 (1948), also quoted by the Seeger court, 380 U.S. at
187. For an example of a highly subjective belief which is so incompre-
hensible that it defies classification as religious, philosophical, secular, or
as anything but nonsense, see United States ex rel. Confield v. Tillson, 312
F. Supp. 831 (S.D. Ga. 1970) (granting c.o. status).
from Judge Augustus Hand's simplistic idea that objection to a
particular war is political rather than religious, 119 an idea which
the Christian just-war doctrine proves not to be universally true. 120
Furthermore, a judicial interpretation broad enough to cover the
selective objector would accommodate the statute to the first
amendment right to the free exercise of religion without offending
that same amendment's establishment clause since the statute's
coverage would be broad enough to be neutral.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
A. Definition of Religion
If the first amendment means anything, it precludes govern-
mental attempts to define religion or determine whether a belief
is or is not "religious" or what is orthodox and what is not.' 21 Not
only do such attempts violate the establishment clause, but they
also amount to a censorship of religion and, thereby, burden its
free exercise. As the Supreme Court said in Seeger:
Local [draft] boards and courts . . . are not free to reject
beliefs because they consider them "incomprehensible."
Their task is to decide whether the beliefs professed by a
registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in his
own scheme of things, religious. [T]he "truth" of a be-
119. United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943). The
National Advisory Commission on Selective Service said that its majority
rejected selective objection because, among other reasons:
[S]elective pacifism is essentially a political question of support
or nonsupport of a war and cannot be judged in terms of special
moral imperatives. Political opposition to a particular war should
be expressed through recognized democratic processes and should
claim no special right of exemption from democratic decisions.
NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON SELECTIVE SERVICE REP., IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY:
WHO SERVES WHEN NOT ALL SERVE? 50 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Marshall
Commission].
120. See Potter, Conscientious Objection to Particular Wars, in 4 RE-
LIGION & PUBLIC ORDER 44, 66-73 (1968). See also text accompanying notes
80-84 supra.
121, Presbyterian Church of the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue
Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445-52 (1969); Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1968); Kreshnik v. St. Nicholas Cathe-
dral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953);
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116-119 (1952); West
Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940); Gonzales v. Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1
(1929); Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146,
1156-57, 1160 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 434 (1969); United States v.
Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 444-45 (D. D.C. 1968). See also KONvTZ, RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY AND CONSCIENCE 37-49 (1968); Boyan, Defining Religion in Oper-
ational and Institutional Terms, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 479 (1968); Rabin, supra
note 58, at 242-44; Weiss, Privilege, Posture, and Protection: "Religion" in
the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593, 604 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Weiss]; Comment,
Defining Religion: Of God, the Constitution and the D.A.R., 32 U. CHI. L.
REv. 533, 545-47 (1965); Comment, The Conscientious Objector: There but
for the Grace of God, 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 79 at 95-100 (1966); Comment,




lief is not open to question .... 122
The citizen simply has a constitutional right to believe what he
cannot prove,123 and American law knows no heresy and is com-
mitted to the support of no dogma.12 4 This well-established con-
stitutional principle should preclude Congress, draft boards, courts,
and military chaplains from the arcane business of determining
whether a belief is religious or secular. It should also preclude
them from employing theologians or clerics to decide whether the
just-war doctrine is or is not a teaching of the Roman Catholic
Church.' 25
The Marshall Commission objected to accepting the just-war
doctrine as a basis for selective-objector exemption on the ground
that the doctrine would be interpreted differently by different de-
nominations and, therefore, was a matter on which the Commission
should not pass judgment.126 But the Commission passed judgment
on the relevance of pacifism, which is also interpreted differently
by different denominations, 7 to the extent of accepting it as a
valid ground for exemption, and passed judgment on the just-war
doctrine to the extent of rejecting it." 8 Certainly any Protestant
would protest that the lack of uniform interpretation does not make
a doctrine non-religious. The Commission must have thought so,
however, since it held that "so-called selective pacifism . . . cannot
be judged in terms of. . . moral imperatives.'
'129
The first amendment doubtless bars draft boards, courts, and
military chaplains from determining whether the selective objector
is right in his assessment of moral and religious values. The doc-
trine of "political questions""' also doubtless bars them from pass-
122. 380 U.S. at 184-185. See also note 61 supra. Judge James E.
Doyle said that whether a claimant's beliefs on which conscientious objec-
tion is founded are "religious" is not a matter of fact (or of a military chap-
lain's opinion), but a matter of law (as defined in Seeger). Therefore, an
opinion about the proper label to be given to these beliefs cannot in itself
provide a basis in fact for denial of c.o. status. Morin v. Grade, 301 F. Supp.
614, 619 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
123. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 (1944).
124. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1872).
125. See note 59 supra. Catholic priests, however, found that Bowen's
and McFadden's "just war" beliefs were Catholic teaching. See notes 75
and 76 supra. See also Judge Stanley A. Weigel's sage comments
about the impropriety of the courts' exploring into what is or is not doc-
trinal orthodoxy in United States v. Bowen, 2 S.S.L.R. 3421, n.1 (N.D. Cal.
1969).
126. Marshall Commission, supra note 119, at 50.
127. Most Seventh Day Adventists will accept non-combatant service in
the military whereas most Quakers will not. NAT'L INTERRELIGIOUS SERV.
BD., supra note 89, at 32-34, 63.
128. Marshall Commission, supra note 119, at 50-51.
129. Id. at 50.
130. See note 95 supra.
ing on the validity of a selective objector's assessment of the political
and military information available to him. Their proper role would
seem to be restricted to determining whether his objection is sincere
and "truly held."13 1 Whether a certain war is "just" or "unjust" is
a matter of individual religious belief into which governmental
agencies are forbidden to delve.'3 2
B. Religious Establishment
If the Supreme Court does not stretch the statute to cover selec-
tive objectors but reaches the constitutional issues, it could decide
the selective-objector cases on the narrower and stronger ground
of the first amendment's prohibition against laws respecting the es-
tablishment of religion, as was done by Judge Stanley A. Weigel in
United States v. Bowen.'3 3 The Court could simply hold that the
law, in exempting pacifists, violates the establishment clause by pre-
ferring "religious" pacifists over "religious" objectors to a particu-
lar war. This would enable the Court to avoid, at least temporarily,
the question of whether conscientious-objector exemption is a con-
stitutional right independent of congressional action-an issue that
the Court would be forced to face if it settled the cases on free exer-
cise grounds.
Until the second circuit court's decision in Seeger in 1964,134 the
assumption, often tacit but occasionally express, was that exemption
from military service is a privilege granted by statute so that Con-
gress can condition the exemption as Congress sees fit." 5 With this
131. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965).
132. "Whether a certain war is theocratic or not is a matter of re-
ligious belief into which we are forbidden to delve." Taffs v. United
States, 208 F.2d 329, 331 (8th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 928 (1954).
133. 2 S.S.L.R. 3421 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
134. See text accompanying notes 19 and 20 supra.
135. See, e.g., United States v. Levy, 419 F.2d 360, 366 (8th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Crouch, 415 F.2d 425, 430 (5th Cir. 1969); Carson v. United
States, 411 F.2d 631, 633 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 885 (1969); Turner
v. United States, 410 F.2d 837, 840 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Fallon,
407 F.2d 621, 623 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 908 (1969); Elizarrez v.
United States, 400 F.2d 898, 902 (5th Cir. 1968); Clay v. United States, 397
F.2d 901, 912 (5th Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds, 394 U.S. 310 (1969);
Loewing v. United States, 392 F.2d 218, 219 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 878 (1969); Salamy v. United States, 379 F.2d 838, 841 (10th Cir.
1967); Parrott v. United States, 370 F.2d 388, 391 (9th Cir. 1966); Fleming
v. United States, 344 F.2d 912, 915 (10th Cir. 1965); Keefer v. United States,
313 F.2d 773, 776-77 (9th Cir. 1963); Pickens v. Cox, 282 F.2d 784, 785 (10th
Cir. 1960); Keene v. United States, 266 F.2d 378, 383 (10th Cir. 1959);
Korte v. United States, 260 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 928 (1959); Clark v. United States, 236 F.2d 13, 23 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 352 U.S. 882 (1956); Uffleman v. United States, 230 F.2d 297, 298 (9th
Cir.. 1956); United States v. Bendick, 220 F.2d 249, 252 (2d Cir. 1955);
White v. United States, 215 F.2d 782, 785 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
970 (1954); George v. United States, 196 F.2d 445, 448-52 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 843 (1952); Tyrrell v. United States, 200 F.2d 8, 13 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 910 (1952); Imbodian v. United States, 194 F.2d
508, 513 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 957 (1952); United States v. Kime,
188 F.2d 677, 679 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 823 (1951); Ritcher v.
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assumption, various lower federal courts had no difficulty in find-
ing that the statute's c.o. provision violates neither the establish-
ment nor the free exercise clause of the first amendment. 18 6
This was the position taken by the three dissenters in Welsh.
5 7
Their spokesman, Justice White, argued that the statute's c.o. provi-
sion was not designed to grant a religious benefit to religious paci-
fists but to limit military service to those who are prepared to fight.
Since section 6 (j) had a secular rather than a religious purpose, Jus-
tice White contended that the Sunday Closing Law Cases'38 should
United States, 181 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1950); Weightman v. United
States, 142 F.2d 188, 191 (1st Cir. 1944); United States v. Crocker, 308 F.
Supp. 998, 1001 (D. Minn. 1970); United States v. McDonald, 301 F. Supp.
79, 84 (N.D. Ia. 1969); United States v. Warner, 284 F. Supp. 366, 369
(D. Ariz. 1968); United States v. Carson, 282 F. Supp. 261, 268 (E.D. Ark.
1968); Brown v. McNamara, 263 F. Supp. 686, 690 (D. N.J.), aff'd, 387 F.2d
150 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied sub noma. Brown v. Clifford, 390 U.S. 1005
(1968); United States ex rel. O'Hare v. Eichstaedt, 285 F. Supp. 476, 480-81
(N.D. Cal. 1967); United States v. Kenstler, 250 F. Supp. 883, 834 (W.D. Pa.
1966), aff'd, 377 F.2d 559 (3d Cir. 1967); United States v. Monroe, 150 F.
Supp. 785, 786, 788 (S.D. Cal. 1957); United States v. Izumihara, 120 F.
Supp. 36, 39-40 (D. Hawaii 1954); United States v. Newman, 44 F. Supp.
817, 819-20 (E.D. Ill. 1942); United States v. Noyd, 2 S.S.L.R. 3218 (U.S.C.
M.A., No. 21,642, Aug. 15, 1969). See also Comment, Conscientious Ob-
jectors, 45 DIcu. L. REv. 129-34 (1941); notes 17 and 18 supra.
136. See, e.g., United States v. Milliken, 416 F.2d 676, 680 (9th Cir.
1969); United States v. McQueary, 408 F.2d 493, 494 (9th Cir. 1969), re-
manded, 90 S. Ct. 2231 (1970) (in light of Welsh); Loewing v. United States,
392 F.2d 218, 219 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 878 (1969); Etche-
verry v. United States, 320 F.2d 873-74 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
930 (1963); Clark v. United States, 236 F.2d 13, 24 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 882 (1956); George v. United States, 196 F.2d 445, 448-50 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 843 (1952); United States v. Kime, 188 F.2d 677, 679
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 823 (1951); United States v. Crocker,
308 F. Supp. 998, 1001 (D. Minn. 1970); United States v. Neamand, 302 F.
Supp. 1296, 1305-06 (M.D. Pa. 1969); United States v. Branigan, 299 F.
Supp. 225, 231-32 (S.D. N.Y. 1969); United States ex rel. O'Hare v. Eich-
staedt, 285 F. Supp. 476, 480 (N.D. Cal. 1967); United States v. Seeger, 216
F. Supp. 516, 521-22 (S.D. N.Y. 1963), rev'd on statutory grounds, 380 U.S.
163 (1965). See also In re Weitzman, 284 F. Supp. 514, 518 (D. Minn.
1968), rev'd, 3 S.S.L.R. 3040 (8th Cir. 1970).
137. Dissenting were Justices White, Berger, and Stewart, 90 S. Ct. 1792,
1812 (1970). Welsh had no standing to raise the constitutional issue. Id.
at 1811-12.
138. Three cases upheld the Sunday closing laws of Maryland (Mc-
Gowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429-53 (1961)) and Pennsylvania (Two
Guys from Harrison v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 592-98 (1961); Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) ) on the ground that the secular purpose was
to designate a day of rest and that the establishment clause did not pre-
vent the state from making such a secular regulation merely because it
happens to harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions. Gal-
lagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961), held that the
Massachusetts law was constitutional as applied to the owner of a kosher
market, his Orthodox Jewish customers, and the rabbis who inspected the
market. In the Welsh dissent, Justice White raised the question of
be controlling. 13 9 Justice White also argued that exemption from
military service is no more an establishment of religion than is the
Sabbatarians' exemption from working on Saturday 140 or the
Evangelists' exemption from the tax on book sales. 141 Since the
Court has held that these two latter exemptions are required by
the free exercise clause, the dissenters continued, these exemptions
do not offend the establishment clause merely because they fail to
include non-religionists. 142 Justice White contended that, in exer-
cising its power to raise armies,1 43 Congress was merely attempting
to accommodate the statute to the free exercise of religion whether
required by the free exercise clause or not. 144 The dissent con-
cluded by reminding the Court that the free exercise clause applies
to religion and not to non-religion and by asserting that the estab-
lishment clause does not invalidate these exemptions, especially if
they are required by the free exercise clause.
145
In his concurring opinion in Welsh, Justice Harlan agreed with
the dissenters that c.o. exemption from military service is a matter
of legislative grace, is not required by the free exercise clause, and
could be abolished by Congress without offending the free exercise
clause, which does not require Congress to conform a neutral secu-
lar program to any group's dictates of conscience. 14" But, if Con-
gress allows c.o. exemptions, Justice Harlan continued, the estab-
lishment clause and the fifth amendment's due process clause pre-
clude Congress from making a distinction between religious and
whether the Sunday closing laws of twenty-one states violate the establish-
ment clause by granting exemption to Sabbatarians without granting ex-
emptions to others who claim non-religious reasons for not working on some
particular day of the week. 90 S. Ct. at 1814.
139. 90 S. Ct. at 1812.
140. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The Court held that the
free exercise clause was violated by denying unemployment compensation
to a Seventh Day Adventist who refused "suitable" employment that re-
quired her to work on Saturday. Such a regulation, the court said,
forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion
and forfeiting [unemployment] benefits, on the one hand and
abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept
work on the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice
puts the same kind of a burden upon the free exercise of religion as
would a fine imposed against the appellant for her Saturday wor-
ship.
Id. at 404. The Court specifically denied that its ruling offended the estab-
lishment clause. Id. at 409-10. The dissenters in Welsh contended that the
establishment clause does not make the holding in Sherbert unconstitu-
tional. 90 S. Ct. at 1814.
141. Follette v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (holding that a Jeho-
vah's Witness' sale of religious literature is an exercise of religion and not a
commercial enterprise so that these sales could not be taxed even though
the tax was not discriminatory and the seller made his entire living from
the sale of this literature).
142. 90 S. Ct. at 1812-13.
143. Congress shall have power "[tlo raise and support Armies . ..
[and] to provide and maintain a Navy ..... U.S. CowsT. art. I, § 8.
144. 90 S. Ct. at 1813.
145. Id. at 1814.
146. Id. at 1805, 1806 n.9.
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secular scruples. 147 Thus, four justices agreed that c.o. exemption
is a matter of congressional grace and is not required by the free ex-
ercise clause, but only three agreed that this allows Congress to
grant the exemption to religious pacifists while denying it to others.
Although Justice Harlan agreed that c.o. exemption from mili-
tary service is a privilege granted by Congress, he pointed out that
the Supreme Court's only pronouncements on the subject were
mere dicta. 4 8 What these earlier cases actually held was that the
Government's interest was sufficient to require a conscientious ob-
jector to take an oath to bear arms in defense of the United States
or to take military training in order to qualify for a certain benefit
such as naturalization 149 or admission to the bar' 50 or attendance
at the state university. 5 1 The Supreme Court has never said that
the Government may constitutionally use the criminal law to com-
pel a conscientious objector to violate his conscience by entering the
service. 52 Moreover, the Supreme Court has moved a long way in
the area of first amendment rights since it enunciated the last of
these dicta so that they may now be challenged, and it would not be
surprising if the Court rejected them.
147. Id. at 1805-07. One might use the same argument with respect to
the distinction between complete pacifist and selective pacifist religions.
See text accompanying notes 155 and 156 infra.
148. 90 S. Ct. at 1806. See also note 3 supra.
149. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931), in which the Court
said in dictum: "[W]hether any citizen shall be exempt from serving in the
armed forces of the nation in time of war is dependent upon the will of
Congress and not upon the scruples of the individual. . . ." Id. at 623.
Then, after referring to the statutory exemption for pacifists, the Court
continued: "The conscientious objector is relieved of the obligation to bear
arms by no constitutional provision, express or implied, but because, and
only because, it has accorded with the policy of Congress thus to relieve
him." Id. And, again in the way of dictum, the Court added:
The privilege of the . . . conscientious objector to avoid bearing
arms comes, not from the Constitution, but from acts of Congress.
That body may grant or withhold the exemption as in its wisdom
it sees fit; and, if it is withheld, the_ .. conscientious objector
cannot successfully assert the privilege.
Id. at 624. In answer to Macintosh's assertion that he put his allegiance
to God's will above his allegiance to the state, Justice Sutherland ob-
jected to the individual's making "his own interpretation of the will of
God the decisive test," and stated quite dogmatically that "obedience to
the laws of the land . . . made for war . . . are not inconsistent with the
will of God." Id. at 625 (Court's emphasis). Chief Justice Hughes wrote a
dissent for Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, and himself. See note 13
supra. This case was overruled by Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61
(1946).
150. In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
151. Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
152. For a more detailed discussion of Macintosh, Summers, and Ham-
ilton, see Mansfield, supra note 58, at 61-66.
Even if the free exercise clause does not require c.o. exemptions,
Congress still cannot make these exemptions subject to unconstitu-
tional conditions. 1 3 One circuit and three district courts have held
that the statute's distinction between religious and non-religious
pacifists violates the establishment clause,1 " while two other dis-
trict judges have held that the distinction between complete paci-
fists and selective pacifists also violates the establishment clause. 15
In the two latter cases, the courts simply found that the effect of
the requirement for opposition to "war in any form" discriminates
against members of just-war churches and in favor of members of
pacifist churches and that it prefers pacifist doctrines over the just-
war doctrine. In short, the statute exempts Quakers but denies ex-
emption to Catholic just-war objectors, and the constitutional in-
firmity is not lessened by the fact that the statute does not men-
tion these denominations by name. Interestingly, this view is also
held by Major David M. Brahms of the Army's Judge Advocate
General's Corps.156
153. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 405-06, 410 (1963) (holding that,
although unemployment compensation was a statutory rather than a consti-
tutional right, the legislature could not saddle this right with unconstitu-
tional conditions); accord, Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); First
Unitarian Church v. Los Angeles, 357 U.S. 545 (1958) (holding unconsti-
tutional a California law that denied tax exemption to all persons who did
not first sign an oath declaring that they did not advocate the overthrow
of the Government by force or violence. The Court held that the effect of
the oath requirement was to unconstitutionally place on the applicant for
tax exemption the burden of proving his innocence. While the state legisla-
ture might deny tax exemption altogether, the legislature could not grant
such exemption on unconstitutional conditions). See also French, Uncon-
stitutional Conditions, 50 GEo. L.J. 234 (1961); Van Alstyne, The Demise
of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV.
1439 (1968); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HAuv. L. Rsv. 1595 (1960).
154. See text accompanying note 20 supra; and notes 59 and 103
supra.
155. See notes 75, 76 and 103 supra (in McFadden, Judge Zirpoli held
that this distinction also violates the free exercise clause, as did Judge
Wyzanski in Sisson, but Judge Weigel expressly stated in Bowen that he
did not deal with the free exercise issue since he had disposed of the case
on establishment grounds).
156. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DimEcTivE No. 1300.6 (10 May 1968),
which provides for the discharge of in-service conscientious objectors or
for their reassignment to non-combatant service and which purports to
conform to the statute (50 U.S.C.A. § 456(j) (1968)), specifically excludes
selective objectors (§ IV-B) and objectors whose objection is based on
political, sociological, philosophical, or personal moral views (§ V), the
latter of which was revised on June 29, 1970, to conform to Welsh. 3
S.S.L.R. 12 (5-70). Writing before this revision, Major Brahms argued that
these two provisions violate both the free exercise and establishment
clauses, and he specifically notes that the first exclusion establishes a
denominational preference among religious conscientious objectors in viola-
tion of the establishment clause. Brahms, They Step to a Different Drum-
mer: A Critical Analysis of the Current Department of Defense Position
Vis-a-Vis In-Service Conscientious Objectors, 47 MILITARY L. REv. 1, 16,
20-21 (1970) (published by the Dept. of the Army) [hereinafter cited as
Brahms]. Major Brahms also contends that D.O.D. No. 1300.6 does not
provide the constitutionally required administrative due process (id. at 21-
24) and discriminates against the in-service c.o. in comparison to pre-service
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The position taken by Major Brahms, Justice Harlan, and
others who think that the statute's section 6(j) violates the estab-
lishment clause, seems quite in harmony with the Supreme Court's
position on the establishment clause during the last quarter of a
century. In 1944, the Court said that the establishment clause cer-
tainly precludes government from favoring one religion over an-
other.157  Three years later, in Everson v. Board of Education,158
the Court said: "Neither [a state nor the federal government] can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one re-
ligion over another."'159 While there were strong dissents in Ever-
son, the dissenters did not challenge the majority's interpretation
of the establishment clause as being too broad but thought that
the majority was applying that interpretation too narrowly to the
facts of the case.
The following year, the Court reaffirmed these views in Illinois
ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education.'"0  Speaking in a concur-
ring opinion for himself and the other Everson dissenters, Justice
Frankfurter said: "We are all agreed that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments have a secular reach far more penetrating in the
conduct of Government than merely to forbid an 'established
church.' "161 As spokesman for the Court three years later in
Zorach v. Clauson'6 2 Justice Douglas said: "The government must
be neutral when it comes to competition between sects.' 6 Thus,
the Court's thinking on the establishment clause even before 1952
objectors and to non-objectors being discharged from the service so that it
denied the equal protection guaranteed by the fifth amendment's due proc-
ess clause. Id. at 24-28.
157. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944).
158. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
159. Id. at 15. The Court held that New Jersey had not violated the
establishment clause (made applicable to the states by the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause) in spending public funds to provide bus
transportation for parochial-school children as part of a general program
that paid fare for children attending both public and private schools. The
Court reasoned that the program was designed to protect children from
hazards on their way to and from school, i.e., to benefit the child and not
the religious school that he attended. Id. Justices Frankfurter, Jackson,
Rutledge, and Burton dissented. Id. at 18, 28.
160. 333 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1948) (holding that the establishment clause
had been violated by a program allowing sectarian teachers to give non-
compulsory religious instruction to public-school children in the school
buildings during school hours).
161. Id. at 213 (concurring opinion).
162. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
163. Id. at 314 (1952) (upholding the constitutionality of a New York
program that released children from public schools during school hours
to go to religious instruction conducted by sectarian groups on their own
premises) (this should not be interpreted as repudiating McCollum since
the Court said: "We follow the McCollum case." Id. at 315).
would point to the conclusion that the Selective Service Act's favor-
ing pacifist beliefs over just-war beliefs is precisely what the estab-
lishment clause forbids. If selective objection can be "religious" as
the just-war doctrine proves and as three district courts have
held,16 4 granting exemptions to "religious" pacifists but not to "reli-
gious" selective objectors offends the first amendment. Even the
alleged impossibility of exempting all objectors does not in itself
justify an unconstitutional discrimination between "religious" ob-
jectors.
Since 1961, the Supreme Court has been equally firm in its
standards for the neutrality required by the establishment clause
and has extended these standards to protect non-believers as well.
Speaking for the Court in 1961, Justice Black said: "Neither [a state
nor the federal government] can constitutionally pass laws or im-
pose requirements which aid all religions against non-believers, and
neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of
God as against those religions founded on different beliefs."'16 5
Speaking for the Court again the following year, Justice Black
stated:
The First Amendment was added to the Constitution to
stand as a guarantee . . . that the people's religions must
not be subjected to the pressures of government ....
The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause,
does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental
compulsion and is violated . . . whether those [establish-
ment] laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving indi-
viduals or not. . . . When the power. . . of government is
placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect
coercive pressure. . . is plain.'16
In 1963167 and again in 1968,16 s the Court reaffirmed these views
164. United States v. McFadden, 309 F. Supp. 502 (N.D. Cal. 1970);
United States v. Bowen, 2 S.S.L.R. 3421 (N.D. Cal. 1969); United States v.
Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969).
165. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (unanimously holding
that Maryland's requirement for an oath affirming belief in God as a qual-
ification for office violates the first and fourteenth amendments) (Justice
Black listed various religions in the United States that do not teach a con-
ventional belief in the existence of God-Buddhism, Ethical Culture, Secu-
lar Humanism, and others. Id. at 495, n.1l).
166. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429-31 (1962) (emphasis added)
(holding that a non-denominational prayer composed by the Regents and
used in New York's public schools violated the establishment clause made
applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment).
167. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding
that Bible-reading in the public schools of Maryland and Pennsylvania
was unconstitutional under the establishment clause).
168. Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (upholding the
constitutionality of a New York law that requires local public-school au-
thorities to lend textbooks for secular subjects free of charge to all students
in grades seven through twelve, including students attending private schools
whether secular or religious. The Court supported its conclusion by using
the "child benefit" theory of Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1
(1947). Justices Black and Douglas dissented).
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and enunciated an establishment-clause test that the Selective Ser-
vice Act's c.o. provision could hardly meet:
[W] hat are the purpose and the primary effect of the enact-
ment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of reli-
gion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative
power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say
that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment
Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion.' 
9
The secular legislative purpose of exempting "religious" objectors
is obviously to restrict military service to those who are prepared
to fight, but what is the "primary effect" of the distinction between
pacifists and just-war objectors? Of the distinction between re-
ligious and secular objectors?
Nor could the Selective Service Act's section 6(j) meet the
Court's first amendment requirement in Abington School District
v. Schempp, 170 "that the Government maintain strict neutrality,
neither aiding nor opposing religion." 71 Furthermore, the Court
affirmed that
it is not within the power of government to invade that
citadel [of the individual heart and mind] . . . to aid or op-
pose, to advance or retard [religion]. In the relationship
between man and religion, the State is firmly committed to
a position of neutrality.1
2
In his concurring opinion in Schempp, Justice Goldberg agreed that
the first amendment requires that "government . . . effect no fa-
voritism among sects or between religion and nonreligion, and that
it work deterrence of no religious belief."
' 178
That the Selective Service Act does not expressly mention just-
war beliefs or Quakers or Catholics or any other sectarian group is
not enough to save the Act from constitutional infirmity under the
first amendment. In 1968, the Supreme Court unanimously in-
validated an Arkansas statute that forbade the teaching of evolu-
tion in the State's public schools, colleges, and universities on the
ground that the statute favored the fundamentalist sects' interpre-
tation of Genesis 1 and 2 over the beliefs of others even though the
statute mentioned neither any sect nor the Biblical account of the
169. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (em-
phasis added). Also quoted approvingly in Board of Education v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) and applied to the facts of the case at bar.
170. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
171. Id. at 225.
172. Id. at 226.
173. Id. at 305 (concurring opinion).
divine creation of man. 17 4 In this case, the Court said:
Government in our democracy ... must be neutral in
matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may
not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of no-re-
ligion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion
or religious theory against another or even against the
militant opposite. The First Amendment mandates gov-
ernmental neutrality between religion and religion, and be-
tween religion and nonreligion.'
7'
The Supreme Court's pronouncements on the establishment
clause add up to the conclusion that the Government may not adopt
programs or practices that would aid or oppose any religious belief.
This would seem to mean that, if Congress allows conscientious-ob-
jector exemption from military service, the exemptions must be
broad enough to be religiously neutral. It is submitted, therefore,
that the statute's section 6(j) is unconstitutional because of under-
inclusion. This would seem to give the Court the option of either
invalidating the unconstitutional provision so that there were no ex-
emptions or extending its coverage to include those who are ag-
grieved by exclusion. 1 76 Thus, if the Court does not interpret the
statute to cover Negre and Gillette,177 these cases should still be re-
versed on the basis of the establishment clause,178 provided, of
course, that the appellants meet the test of "sincerity."
Although Negre and Gillette are secular objectors to a particu-
lar war, whatever the Court may decide in their cases presumably
will also apply to "religious" objectors to a particular war since the
establishment clause precludes Government from favoring those
who believe in no religion. The clause does not require the Govern-
ment to be hostile to religion. Governmental power is no more to
be used to handicap religion than to favor religion.'7 9 And, con-
versely, whatever the Court might decide in the case of a just-war
selective objector presumably would also apply to other selective
objectors since the Court has unequivocally rejected the contention
that the establishment clause merely forbids governmental prefer-
ence of one religion over another. 8 0
174. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
175. Id. at 103-04.
176. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 543 (1942); Iowa-Des Moines
Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 247 (1931).
177. See notes 99-101 and accompanying text supra.
178. Negre was denied a writ of habeas corpus for his release from
the service while Gillette was convicted for refusal to submit to induction,
both under a statute that creates a religious benefit for the pacifist not
accorded to them as selective objectors. Since these cases are not actions for
a declaration on the constitutionality of section 6(j), 50 U.S.C.A. § 456 (j)
(1968), the lower courts' decisions must be reversed on establishment
grounds. At least this would be true of Gillette, who is involved in a
criminal prosecution. See Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Welsh v.
United States, 90 S. Ct. 1792, 1807-09 (1970).
179. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963); Zorach
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952); Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
180. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963); Tor-
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If the Court extends the c.o. exemption by statutory interpre-
tation or on the basis of the establishment clause, the Court can
avoid serious problems that would necessarily be raised by settling
the selective-objector cases on free-exercise grounds. But, if the
Court excises the exemption or congressional rejection of the
Court's extension of the exemption leads to its repeal, the Court
would, sooner or later, be faced by an appellant, perhaps a Quaker,
who would assert that the lack of c.o. exemption had denied him the
free exercise of his religion.
C. Free Exercise and Equal Protection
1. Free Exercise
The Court's interpretation of the first amendment's establish-
ment clause suggests that it may conflict with the same amend-
ment's guarantee of the free exercise of religion, a paradox noted
by Justice Stewart,18 1 and various commentators. 8 2 There are four
major theories on the relationship between these two clauses."83
The so-called "Neutrality Theory" of Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion'1 4 and McGowan v. Maryland'8 5 supports the constitutionality
of a neutral secular program provided that it does not burden the
free exercise of religion. This leads to the "Accommodation The-
ory" of Zorach v. Clauson8 6 and Sherbert v. Verner,8 7 which reads
the establishment clause narrowly, begins with the premise that
caso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948) (concurring opinion); Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). See also, Giannella, Religious Lib-
erty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, Part I, 80 HARv. L.
REV. 1381, 1415 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Giannella].
181. In his dissent in Schempp, Justice Stewart argued that the Court's
doctrinaire interpretation of the establishment clause in Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948), and Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962), leads to an irreconcilable conflict with the free exer-
cise clause. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 309 (1963).
In his concurring opinion in Sherbert, Justice Stewart asserted that McCol-
lum, Engel and especially Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), cannot
be reconciled with Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 414-15, 417 (1963).
182. See, e.g., Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U.
Cm. L. REv. 426, 428 (1953); Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools and the Su-
preme Court, 61 MIcH. L. REV. 1031, 1053 (1963); Macgill, supra note 58, at
1393 n.149.
183. There is a substantial volume of literature on this subject. For a
good, brief summary see Comment, The Conscientious Objector and the
First Amendment: There but for the Grace of God, 34 U. Cm. L. REv.
79, 81-95 (1966).
184. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
185. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
186. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
187. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
such secular programs cannot be hostile to religion, and concludes
that the free exercise clause requires the accommodation of secular
programs to minimize interference with religious practice. 88 The
third, or "Separation Theory," gives precedence to the establish-
ment over the free exercise clause, is represented by Justice Rut-
ledge's dissent in Everson,18 9 and has never commanded a majority
of the Court.
The fourth theory, propounded by one commentator, Professor
Philip B. Kurland, holds that "religion may not be used as a basis
for classification for the purposes of governmental action, whether
that action be the conferring of rights or privileges or the imposi-
tion of duties or obligations.' 190 This theory has been used to argue
that giving any exemption to religious objectors violates the estab-
lishment clause. 9 Although there seems to be some support for
the "Kurland Theory" in Everson'9 2 and McCoflum, 193 the theory
was rejected by even the dissenters in Sherbert.19 4
One commentator has very ably demonstrated that the first
two theories could be used to make c.o. exemption from military
service a constitutional right under the free exercise clause while
the third theory would allow Congress to grant these exemptions
without offending the establishment clause. 195 It does not follow
from this third theory, however, that Congress must grant these
exemptions. This, of course, is the basis for the position that c.o.
exemptions are a matter of legislative grace rather than a constitu-
tional right.196 Concurring in Welsh, Justice Harlan contended that
188. In his concurring opinion in Sherbert, Justice Stewart wrote:
[T]he guarantee of religious liberty embodied in the Free Exer-
cise Clause affirmatively requires government to create an atmos-
phere of hospitality and accommodation to individual belief or
disbelief. [Our Constitution commands the positive protection
by government of religious freedom-not only for a minority, how-
ever small-not only for the majority, however large-but for each
of us.
Id. at 415-16. After asserting that Braunfeld, Engel, and Schempp had
been wrongly decided, Justice Stewart said that exemption to a neutral
secular program "is constitutionally required to carry out 'the governmen-
tal obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences ... '" Id.
at 416.
189. 330 U.S. at 28-63.
190. P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 18 (1962). This theory was
represented in the Frankfurter-Jackson dissent in Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105, 134-40 (1943).
191. Donnici, Governmental Encouragement of Religious Ideology: A
Study of the Current Conscientious Objector Exemption from Military Serv-
ice, 13 J. Pus. L. 16, 37-38 (1964).
192. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
193. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
194. 374 U.S. at 422. See also In re Jenison, 265 Minn. 96, 120 N.W.2d
515, rev'd, 375 U.S. 14, on remand, 267 Minn. 136, 137, 125 N.W.2d 588, 589
(1963).
195. Comment, The Conscientious Objector and the First Amendment:
There but for the Grace of God, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 79, 81-93 (1966).
196. Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389, 395 (1953). See also
cases cited notes 135 and 136 supra.
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Congress could eliminate all c.o. exemptions without offending the
free exercise clause.137 This position can be logically reconciled
with Justice Brennan's position in Schempp that the establishment
clause compels neutrality, not hostility, toward religion so that the
clause does not preclude Congress from exempting religious objec-
tors since congressional failure to provide such exemption would
be hostility rather than neutrality.""5 Furthermore, Justice Bren-
nan specifically denied that this necessarily implied "that govern-
ment must provide . . . draft exemptions, or that the courts should
intercede if it [Congress] fails to do so."'1 9 In short, the "Harlan-
Brennan Theory" permits, but does not necessarily require, Con-
gress to provide exemption for religious objectors.
Justice Brennan's position in Sherbert, however, implies that
the free exercise clause may require such an exemption. 200 More-
over, three district judges have expressly suggested, but not ruled,
that denial of c.o. exemptions would unconstitutionally abridge the
free exercise of religion. 201 Likewise, various commentators have
used the "balancing test" of Sherbert to argue that there is (or
logically ought to be) a constitutional right to c.o. exemption un-
der the free exercise clause. 20 2 Finally, the pronouncements and
voting records of various members of the present Supreme Court
suggest that c.o. exemption would be held to be constitutionally
required if the question were unavoidably presented in a case at
bar.2
03
197. 90 S. Ct. at 1805.
198. 374 U.S. at 299 (concurring opinion).
199. Id. (emphasis in original).
200. See discussion in text accompanying notes 215-223 infra. Justice
Brennan spoke for five justices, and the two concurring justices, Doug-
las and Stewart, would seem in accord on this point.
201. United States v. McFadden, 309 F. Supp. 502, 505-06 (N.D. Cal.
1970) (citing West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) and
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) ); United States v. Branigan, 299 F.
Supp. 225, 231 (S.D. N.Y. 1969) (citing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 212-14 (1963), and Brennan's concurring opinion in Schempp,
id. at 296-99). But see text accompanying notes 196 and 199 supra; United
States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 906-11 (D. Mass. 1969).
202. See, e.g., Macgill, supra note 58, at 1378-83; Mansfield, supra note
58, at 66-67; White, Processing Conscientious Objector Claims: A Constitu-
tional Inquiry, 56 CAL. L. REv. 652, 661-63 (1968) (but favors basing the
claim on the contention that the present process violates the fifth amend-
ment on procedural due process grounds in order to avoid the sticky
question of whether c.o. exemption is a constitutional right); Comment, The
Conscientious Objector and the First Amendment: There but for the Grace
of God, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 79, 88-90 (1966).
203. This observation was made by one commentator in 1966 in Com-
ment, The Conscientious Objector and the First Amendment: There but for
the Grace of God, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 79, 95 (1966), and more recent evidence
does not vitiate his observation.
The arguments using the "balancing test" to support the propo-
sition that c.o. exemption is a free-exercise right, frequently begin
by making a distinction between a restriction on religiously moti-
vated actions and compulsion to act in violation of religious scruple.
The courts have generally upheld restrictions on overt acts
prompted by religious beliefs in order to protect the health, safety,
and morals of the community, e.g., polygamy,20 4 child labor,20 5 use
of narcotics,20 6 parading without a license,207 and conducting busi-
ness on Sunday.20 8 They have generally been reluctant, however,
to uphold legislation commanding one to perform an affirmative ac-
tion that violates conscience, e.g., saluting the flag,20 working on
Saturday2 10 and, recently, killing in an allegedly "unjust" war.211
The late Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone succinctly made this distinc-
tion between repressing religious acts that offend social values and
compelling acts that violate conscience:
[T] here may be and probably is a very radical distinction
between compelling a citizen to refrain from acts which he
regards as moral but which the majority of his fellow
citizens and the law regard as immoral or unwholesome to
the life of the state on the one hand, and compelling him
on the other to do affirmative acts which he regards as un-
conscientious and immoral. The action of the state in com-
pelling the citizen to refrain from doing an act which he
regards as moral and conscientious does not in most in-
stances . . . do violence to his conscience; but conscience is
violated if he is coerced into doing an act which is opposed
to his deepest convictions of right and wrong .... How-
ever rigorous the state may be in repressing the commission
of acts which are regarded as injurious to the state, it may
well stay its hand before it compels the commission of
acts which violate the conscience. 12
Even Justice Stewart, who dissented in Scherpp on the ground
that no coercion was involved in conducting "voluntary" religious
exercises in the public schools,212 would probably agree that com-
204. Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 20 (1946); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (both cases upheld federal laws against
free-exercise claims).
205. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (holding that a
state child labor law may be validly enforced against adults who allow
children under their care to sell religious literature on the streets).
206. Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851, 859-61 (5th Cir. 1967), rev'd
on other grounds, 395 U.S. 6 (1969); United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp.
439 (D. D.C. 1968). But see Giannella, supra note 180, at 1406-1409; Clark,
Religious Aspects of Psychedelic Drugs, 56 CAL. L. REV. 86 (1968); Com-
ment, Free Exercise: Religion Goes to "Pot," 56 CAL. L. REV. 100 (1968).
207. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
208. See cases cited note 138 supra.
209. West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
210. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
211. United States v. McFadden, 309 F. Supp. 502 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
212. H. Stone, The Conscientious Objector, 21 COLUm. U.Q. 253, 268-69
(1919).
213. 374 U.S. at 316-18. In Zorach, the Court, per Justice Douglas, em-
phasized the fact that no coercion was used or, at least, that the record did
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pelling a sincere conscientious objector to participate in war offends
the free exercise clause since the objector's failure to violate his con-
science carries penal sanction.2 14 In Sherbert, the Court held that
South Carolina's law placed an unconstitutional burden on Sher-
bert's Sabbatarian practice of religion since it forced her to choose
between forfeiting unemployment compensation and violating her
conscience by working on Saturday.2 15 This burden seems minimal
compared to compelling a sincere conscientious objector to choose
between prison and killing another human being in war.
216
If the effect of a statute burdens the observance of one or all
religions or discriminates invidiously between them,217 the Sherbert
formula not only requires the court to weigh the gravity of the
burden21s against the alleged governmental interest but also re-
quires the Government to prove a compelling state interest 9 and
that no alternative means would achieve this state interest without
infringing free-exercise rights.220 In Sherbert, the Court found that
the burden on Sherbert's Sabbatarian practice outweighed South
Carolina's alleged interest since the State had not proved that no
alternative forms of regulation would combat the presumed abuses
without abridging first amendment rights. Quite obviously, the
"balancing test" of Sherbert does not provide objective standards
which preclude personal judgment. The test was refined, however,
in the case of In re Jenison.
22'
not show coercion. If the record had shown any coercion, Justice Douglas
said that a wholly different case would be presented. The three dis-
senters all thought that at least covert compulsion was involved. See
note 163 and accompanying text supra. A free-exercise plea requires one
to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against him in
the practice of his religion. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248-49
(1963); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963); En-
gel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
311-12 (1952).
214. Although Justice Stewart joined Justice White's dissent in Welsh,
the dissenters did not think that Welsh's scruple was "religious" and,
consequently, that no free-exercise question was involved. See text accom-
panying notes 137-145 supra.
215. 374 U.S. at 403-04.
216. Judge Zirpoli made this point, applied it to McFadden (who, he
said, was forced to choose between prison and killing in an allegedly
"unjust" war), but gave this selective objector a third alternative-c.o.
status. 309 F. Supp. at 506.
217. 374 U.S. at 404.
218. Id. at 403-04, 406.
219. Id. at 403, 406. Two decades earlier, the Court had said that the
first amendment freedoms are "susceptible of restriction only to prevent
grave and immediate danger to interests which the State may lawfully
protect." West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
220. 374 U.S. at 407.
221. 265 Minn. 96, 120 N.W.2d 515 (1963).
Literally following the Biblical injunction "judge not, that ye
be not judged, '22 Mrs. Jenison refused jury duty and was con-
victed 223 in a Minnesota court on the theory that her claim for re-
ligious exemption was outweighed by the State's interest in main-
taining civil order.224 On remand in the light of Sherbert,225 the
Minnesota Supreme Court found no adequate showing of a com-
pelling state interest and held that people whose religious scruples
prohibit them from jury duty shall be exempt unless and until "the
indiscriminate invoking of the First Amendment poses a serious
threat to the effective functioning of our jury system. '226  As one
commentator has indicated, Jenison is a refinement of the balancing
test in that the Minnesota Supreme Court did not merely balance
the social value of compulsory jury service against the free-exercise
claim but measured the impact of religious exemptions on the
State's interest and found it negligible and, therefore, not warrant-
ing interference with religious liberty. The Jenison court calcu-
lated the social cost of exemption and did not merely assess the ad-
ministrative difficulties that allegedly would result from religious
exemptions as had been done in Sherbert.
217
If religious exemptions from military service were abolished,
Sherbert and Jenison suggest that the Government would have the
burden not only of proving that the collective goal of national secu-
rity could not be achieved without abridging the c.o.'s free-exercise
rights but also of demonstrating the degree to which religious ex-
emptions would interfere with this admittedly compelling govern-
mental interest.22 Likewise, if pacifists are exempted, it would
seem that the Government has the burden not only of proving that
national-security requirements cannot be met without drafting the
religious selective objector for military service but also of demon-
strating the impact that selective exemptions would have on na-
tional security.
Whether Congress may (Zorach) or must (Sherbert) accom-
222. Matt. 7:1.
223. For a criticism of Sherbert and Jenison, see Weiss, supra note 121,
at 620-22.
224. 265 Minn. 96, 120 N.W.2d 515 (1963).
225. 375 U.S. 14 (1963).
226. 267 Minn. 136, 137, 125 N.W.2d 588, 589 (1963).
227. See Giannella, supra note 180, at 1411. Giannella also points out
that a person who has religious scruple against jury duty may be incapable
of performing his function satisfactorily in the state's supplying trial by
peers so that the state's interest may dictate his exemption. Moreover,
relatively few persons on jury rolls are ever called for service, and the
law provides for numerous personal exemptions.
228. Id. In upholding the law punishing the destruction of draft cards,
Chief Justice Warren applied a weak version of the Sherbert "balancing
test" and found for the Government. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
376-77 (1968). Since O'Brien's asserted right was a "penumbral" one, it
may be suggested that the Court would probably apply a more stringent
test for the countervailing governmental interest when the asserted right
is the express constitutional right of free exercise. For a discussion of
"penumbral rights," see Part IV of this Article infra.
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modate the draft to the religious beliefs of registrants, conscrip-
tion legislation must at least be religiously neutral. Sherbert was
decided wholly on the basis of free exercise and not on the basis
of equal protection or religious establishment, 229 but the Court in
Sherbert approvingly quoted from the decision of Braunfeld v.
BTown:230 "If the . . effect of a law . . is to discriminate
invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid
even though the burden may be. . . only indirect. '231 Even Justice
Harlan, who dissented on the ground that South Carolina's statute
was secular, neutral, and did not discriminate against Sherbert be-
cause of her religious beliefs, 2 2 concurred in Welsh on the ground
that the Selective Service Act's c.o. provisions distinguish between
religious and secular scruples in violation of the establishment
clause.23a The just-war objector's claim for exemption would seem
to be even stronger than Welsh's. The just-war objector's claim is
patently based on religious belief so that he could rely not only on
the establishment clause but also on the free exercise clause.
Therefore, a just-war claim for exemption presumably could win
the sympathetic ear of the three Welsh dissenters since their prin-
cipal ground for dissent was that Welsh's scruple was not "reli-
gious. 22 4
It is not the Government's business to say that pacifist beliefs
are religious and that just-war beliefs are not.2 5 Even if c.o. ex-
emption from military service is a privilege granted by Congress,
withholding it from a religious selective objector offends the first
amendment since this favors pacifist beliefs and invidiously dis-
criminates against just-war beliefs.236 If withholding from Jeho-
vah's Witnesses a privilege granted to other religious groups vio-
lates the first amendment,237 then withholding from the just-war
229. 374 U.S. at 410.
230. 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961). See note 138 supra.
231. 374 U.S. at 404.
232. Id. at 418-23. Justice Harlan thought that the establishment clause
did not prevent the state from making exceptions for Sabbatarians, but he
rejected the proposition that the free exercise clause requires the state to
make these exemptions. Id. at 422-23.
233. See text accompanying notes 146 and 147 supra.
234. See note 214 and text accompanying notes 137-145 supra.
235. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953). See note 241
infra.
236. Id. at 69.
237. Id. The Court held that the denial of a permit to conduct re-
ligious services in Pawtucket's public parks while allowing more orthodox
religious groups to use the parks for such services was unconstitutional.
See also Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 577 (1944) (inherent in the
free exercise clause is the principle that one religious group cannot be fa-
vored over another).
objector the privilege granted to pacifists also violates the first
amendment and for the same reason: both amount to invidious
discrimination based on religious belief.
If section 6(j) of the Selective Service Act was designed to
protect the free exercise of religion, it must protect the free exercise
of all religions and not merely those professing pacifism. The stat-
ute's requirement for opposition to war "in any form," however,
conditions the exemption on the requirement that the objector be a
pacifist and, thereby, limits the free exercise of religions that teach
the just-war doctrine. Since the Act protects the free exercise of
pacifist beliefs, the just-war selective objector can argue that his
religious scruples against participating in an "unjust" war are con-
stitutionally entitled to the same protection given to the pacifist's
scruples against participating in war "in any form." In short, the
"in any form" requirement burdens the selective objector's free
exercise of religion quite as much as the "Supreme Being" require-
ment burdened Seeger's and Welsh's free exercise of their non-
theistic "religion," as the flag-salute requirement burdened the re-
ligious liberty of Jehovah's Witnesses, as jury duty burdened Jeni-
son's religious freedom, and as working on Saturday burdened Sher-
bert's free exercise of her Seventh Day Adventist religion. This
was precisely Judge Zirpoli's point in McFadden, in holding that
section 6 (j) not only violated the establishment clause but also of-
fended the free exercise clause by placing a burden on James Fran-
cis McFadden's just-war beliefs.
2
31
That McFadden's beliefs were the product of "religious train-
ing and belief" seems clear from the record. The record indicates
that he was a devout Catholic and had been educated in Catholic
schools through college. John H. Sisson's record, on the other hand,
indicates quite clearly that Sisson was not a religious objector.2 &
If Sisson's selective objection is to be upheld under the establish-
ment clause, however, it presumably must be implied that his belief
is "religious". Consequently, Judge Wyzanski, in Sisson, had no
apparent difficulty in justifying an exemption for Sisson on free-
exercise grounds24 although Judge Wyzanski also found that Sis-
son's beliefs were not based on "religious training and belief"
within the meaning of the Selective Service Act.241 Once the free-
exercise question was reached, Sherbert required Judge Wyzanski
to weigh the selective objector's claims against the conflicting gov-
ernmental interest in national security.
238. 309 F. Supp. at 506.
239. See paragraph in text following note 108 supra.
240. 297 F. Supp. at 910.
241. If Sisson's beliefs were "religious" for first .amendment purposes
but not for statutory purposes, Judge Wyzanski must have interpreted the
statute to mean that selective objection cannot be religious. Obviously, the
political, sociological, and ethical implications of selective objection make it
difficult for the Government to recognize that selective objection can be
religious since the selective objector asserts that his own country is engaged
The Conscientious Objector
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
2. State Interest and Alternative Means
When a law that affects fundamental rights draws a distinc-
tion between classes, that distinction must be supported by a
compelling state interest.242 Recent cases involving fundamental
freedoms suggest that exemptions from military service for "reli-
gious" selective objectors must be sustained on first amendment
grounds, regardless of the statutory provisions, unless the Govern-
ment demonstrates that some overriding governmental interest
would be substantially infringed by permitting these exemptions.243
A free-exercise claim can be overcome, of course, by the Govern-
ment's showing that its application would seriously impair a para-
mount governmental interest.244 In the case of c.o. exemptions
from military service, the Government has two competing interests:
national security and individual religious liberty. It should not be
forgotten that the second is also a governmental interest, as the late
Chief Justice Stone so eloquently noted:
The ultimate test of the course of action which the
state should adopt will of course be the test of its own
self-preservation; but with this limitation, . . . both morals
and sound policy require that the state should not violate
the conscience of the individual. All our history gives con-
firmation to the view that liberty of conscience has a moral
and social value which makes it worthy of preservation at
the hands of the state. So deep is its significance and vital,
indeed, is it to the integrity of man's moral and spiritual na-
ture that nothing short of the self-preservation of the state
in an unjust war and/or is using unjust means of warfare. This assertion
may well be both religious and true, but it is also a political judgment
that contradicts the Government's war effort. The pacifist, on the other
hand, asserts that all warfare is immoral and/or sinful so that the Gov-
ernment can recognize his "religious" claims without vitiating its own po-
litical and moral claims. Giannella, supra note 180, at 1415-16. While the
assertions of just-war objectors in the Third Reich certainly seem to have
been uniformly correct and often religious, they were viewed as treason and
handled accordingly. Needless to say, just-war objectors were not nu-
merous. ZAHN, IN SOLITARY WITNESS: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF HANS
JAGERSTATTER (1964); ZAHN, GERMAN CATHOLICS AND HITLER's WAR (1969).
242. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 403, 406 (1963); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
In Bowen, Judge Weigel found no compelling governmental interest for
distinguishing Bowen, who was a selective objector on religious grounds,
from others who are opposed to all wars. Judge Weigel distinguished
Bowen from Negre on the ground that Negre's selective objection was not
religious while Bowen's was. 2 S.S.L.R. at 3422 n.2. See note 115 supra.
243. Two commentators convincingly argue for this proposition with
respect to religious pacifists, and their argument applies equally to religious
selective objectors. See Tiger and Zweben, Selective Service: Some Certain
Problems and Some Tentative Answers, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 510, 524
(1969).
244. See cases cited notes 138, 204-207 supra; Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
should warrant its violation; and it may well be questioned
whether the state which preserves its life by a settled pol-
icy of violation of the conscience of the individual will not
in fact ultimately lose it by the process.
245
The Supreme Court's handling of Seeger suggests that the Court
will not permit a classification that penalizes the selective objec-
tor's free-exercise rights without the Government's demonstrating
that this is the only way the Selective Service System can be saved.
In Seeger, the Government abstractly argued in terrorem for the
"Supreme Being" requirement but to no avail. The Government's
attempts to salvage the "in any form" requirement will have to
muster enough factual data to prove most convincingly that the ter-
ror is real and not merely theoretical, i.e., that "in any form" is an
essential and objective test of sincerity, without which the system
would be destroyed by the increased number of exemptions.
There are five arguments against exemption for the selective
objector: (1) it would open the door to civil disobedience; (2) it
would endanger morale in the armed forces; (3) the justice or in-
justice of a war is a political decision, which only the Government
should make; (4) it would increase spurious claims and, thereby,
create serious administrative problems; and (5) it would decimate
the manpower pool for the armed services. Efforts to save the
distinction between total and selective objectors presumably would
include pressing one, several, or all of these five assertions.
In its report, a majority of the Marshall Commission contended
that
legal recognition of selective pacifism could open the doors
to a general theory of selective disobedience to law, which
could quickly tear down the fabric of government; the dis-
tinction is dim between a person conscientiously opposed to
participation in a particular war and one conscientiously
opposed to the payment of a particular tax.246
The tax example is a particularly poor one. The distinction has
245. H. Stone, The Conscientious Objector, 21 COLUM. U.Q. 253, 269
(1919) (emphasis added).
246. Marshall Commission, supra note 119, at 50. This was actually
the Commission's third objection to recognizing selective pacifism. For a
discussion of the Commission's first two objections, see text accom-
panying notes 119 and 126-129 supra. The Commission's fourth objection
was that it was unable to see the morality of exempting the selective ob-
jector and yet requiring him to perform non-combatant service in support
of a war that he had concluded to be "unjust." Id. at 50. Rather than an
argument against selective pacifism, this seems to be an argument for as-
signing the selective objector to alternative civilian service (1-0) instead
of non-combatant service in the armed forces (I-A-0). The minority's
proposal would still have invidiously discriminated against the selective
objector by allowing him a narrower option than given to the total ob-
jector, i.e., non-combatant military duty "under conditions of hardship or
even hazard, and perhaps for a longer period (for example, 3 years)." Id.
The proposal was to grant this option liberally to those who elect it and to
do so without proof of a moral or religious base for the claimant's objec-
tion. The total objector, however, would continue to have the option of two
years' alternative civilian service. Id.
The Conscientious Objector
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
been clear to a number of commentators,247 and Judge Wyzanski
argued that denial of selective objection leads precisely to this
dreaded result: "When the law treats a reasonable, conscientious
act as a crime [,] it subverts its own power. It invites civil disobedi-
ence. It impairs the very habits which nourish and preserve the
law "248 Allowing selective objection is not allowing the individual
to decide which laws to obey. On the contrary, the Government
would be deciding to allow the individual to follow his conscience
in one limited area since the individual would apply to the Govern-
ment for exemption from military service, and the Government
could deny the claim if the Government found it to be insincere. If
the individual were being allowed to decide what laws to obey, he
would not be required to apply to the Government for c.o. status.
2 49
The Marshall Commission also asserted that "legal recognition
of selective pacifism could be disruptive to the morale and effective-
ness of the Armed Forces. '250 In McFadden, the district court re-
jected this in terrorem argument on the ground that the armed
forces oppose having their "morale and effectiveness" protected by
saddling them with conscientious objectors. 2 '1 The original reason
for establishing a c.o. classification was to keep conscientious ob-
jectors out of the armed forces since they had been disruptive ele-
ments in the armed forces.2 52 When the manpower shortage was
acute in 1943, a spokesman for the Army, Lt. Col. W. B. Partlow,
Jr., told the Senate Military Affairs Committee: "We are opposed
to the repeal of section 5 (g) of the act, mainly because of the fact
that the type of people who are conscientious objectors would cause
a lot of trouble in the Army. ' 243 The lobbyist for the American
Legion agreed.2 54 Three years earlier, Congressman Charles I. Fad-
dis of Pennsylvania told his colleagues on the House Military Af-
fairs Committee:
247. See, e.g., United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 910 (D. Mass.
1969); Arnold, Selective Objection and the Public Interest, 84 CHRISTIAN
CENTURY 1218, 1220 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Arnold]; Giannella, supra
note 180, at 1409-10; Macgill, supra note 58, at 1383-84.
248. United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 911 (D. Mass. 1969).
See also Arnold, supra note 247, at 1219-20.
249. Comment, Selective Service Law: The Selective Conscientious
Objector, 55 IA. L. REV. 288, 304 (1969).
250. Marshall Commission, supra note 119, at 50. This was the Com-
mission's fifth objection. See note 246 supra.
251. United States v. McFadden, 309 F. Supp. 502, 507-08 (N.D. Cal.
1970).
252. 1 SELECTIVE SERVICE MONOGRAPH No. 11, at 138 (1950).
253. Hearings on S. 315 and S. 675 Before the Senate Military Affairs
Committee, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 23 (Feb. 17, 1943).
254. Id. at 22. (Mr. Bruce Stubblefield reporting the decision of the
Resolutions Committee of the Legion's national convention).
[I] f I were to go out and command the troops-and I may-
I don't want any conscientious objectors in my regiment at
all. I would rather they would be someplace else. They
would be more bother than they would be worth, and a
bad example to the other men. You could not do anything
with them in the way of [training them to be] soldiers
... and I am sure no man who would command the troops
would want them.
25 5
This is precisely the reason for the armed forces' discharging
in-service objectors or reassigning them to non-combatant duty.
25 6
As one commentator has noted, preventing disruption in the armed
forces is a reason that applies to the selective objector quite as
much as to the total objector. There is no rational reason for as-
suming that the selective objector will be more docile or less zealous
in proselytizing for his beliefs than is the total objector. 25 7 This
view is shared by Major Brahms, who concludes: "[A]ccording
recognition to all bona fide ... conscientious objector claimants
can . . .aid the services to achieve an effective fighting force by
properly eliminating unsuitable members .... 258
The Marshall Commission opposed giving legal recognition to
selective objection also on the ground that:
A determination of the justness or unjustness of any war
could only be made within the context of that war itself.
Forcing upon the individual the necessity of making that
distinction-which would be the practical effect of taking
away the Government's obligation of making it for him-
could put a burden heretofore unknown on the man in uni-
form and even on the brink of combat, with results that
could be disastrous to him, to his unit and to the entire
military tradition No such problem arises for the [com-
plete pacifisti conscientious objector, even in uniform [as
an r-A-O noncombatant], who bases his moral stand on
killing in all forms, simply because he is never trained nor
assigned to combat duty.
2 59
The existence of provisions for the discharge or reassignment of in-
service objectors is testimony that the Commission's distinction be-
tween total and selective objectors has some merit in the case of
in-service conscientious objectors. In the case of the pre-induction
objector, however, the distinction has little merit since the problem
255. Hearings on H.R. 10132 Before the House Committee on Military
Affairs, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 205 (July 25, 1940).
256. Brahms, supra note 156, at 17-18; Hochstadt, The Right to Exemp-
tion from Military Service of a Conscientious Objector to a Particular War,
3 HARV. CIVIL RTs.-CIvIL LIBERTIES L. REV. 1, 46-47 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Hochstadt]. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DiREcTIVE No. 1300.6, pur-
suant to authority vested by 10 U.S.C. § 133, as amended, 33 Fed. Reg. 492
(1968), revised June 29, 1970 to conform to Welsh, and implemented by
Army Regulation 635-20, revised July 31, 1970 to conform to Welsh, and
by BunEAu or NAVAL PERSONNEL INSTRUCTION No. 1900.5, 3 S.S.L.R. 12
(5-70).
257. Hochstadt, supra note 256, at 15.
258. Brahms, supra note 156, at 34.
259. Marshall Commission, supra note 119, at 50-51.
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would not arise for the selective objector if he were neither trained
for nor assigned to combat duty.
The third argument against exemption for the selective objec-
tor is essentially that exempting selective objectors amounts to al-
lowing the citizen to reassess the Government's decision for going
to war since the individual would be redeciding issues that only
Congress and/or the President should decide. The Marshall Com-
mission labeled this a "political" decision. The just-war objector
might argue, for example, that the Vietnam War is "unjust" because
the United States has little chance of success without resorting to
"unjust" methods of warfare. His opponents answer that the
Government can better assess the prospects for success than he can.
As one commentator has pointed out, a similar argument can be
made against section 6(j) of the present law since it amounts to al-
lowing the total objector to "second guess" that the United States
should never become involved in any war, at any time, in any place,
for any reason. The conscientious objector, however, whether total
or selective, is deciding what he ought to do, not whether the coun-
try should abstain from participation in all wars or from involve-
ment in a particular war.2 0 Moreover, it is a strange brand of
theology or liberal democratic theory which argues that the citizen
should abdicate his conscience to the Government.
The fourth argument against exempting the selective objector
from military service is that this would open the flood-gates to
spurious claims and, thereby, create insurmountable administrative
problems for the Selective Service System. This argument simply
lacks a rational, factual basis. Presumably, the selective objector
would face the same prospects that a total objector now faces:
either a prison sentence of up to five years and/or a fine of up to
$10,000 if he persists after his claim has been denied,2 1 or, if his
claim is granted, two years of alternative civilian service,262 which
is often more unpleasant and no less hazardous than many mili-
tary assignments but with less pay and with no veterans' benefits.
The conscientious objector, whether total or selective, not only
shares the inductee's disruption of residence and career plans, but
he also cuts himself off from certain types of future employment
and suffers ridicule, abuse, and certain other extra-legal penalties
attached to the mere application for c.o. status. Common sense
suggests that an insincere claimant would seek other deferments
or exemptions that do not carry these penalties.
260. Comment, Selective Service Law: The Selective Conscientious
Objector, 55 IA. L. R-v. 288, 304 (1969).
261. 50 U.S.C.A. § 462(a) (1968).
262. Id. § 456(j); 32 C.F.R. §§ 1622.14 and 1660 (1970).
Major Brahms proposes that, even if the incidence of c.o. claims
should increase, the problem can be obviated not only by an effec-
tive and efficient fact-finding mechanism for making the necessary
determinations of sincerity but also by a short history of successful
detection of fraudulent claims coupled with the imposition of crim-
inal sanctions for false statements. 263 Moreover, as one commen-
tator has proposed, alternative civilian service could be further
tailored to discourage insincere c.o. claimants. Congress could au-
thorize a longer period of alternative service for all conscientious
objectors whether selective or total and could allow the conscien-
tious objector to volunteer for this service just as a draft registrant
can now volunteer for military service. A volunteer for alternative
civilian service would be certain of being called while a selective
service registrant might never be drafted.2 64 One great merit of
this proposal is that the sincerity of the conscientious objector's
claim would be tested by his choice rather than by his draft board's
efforts to scrutinize his motives. Not only does the in terrorem
argument that opening the door to the selective objector would
mean opening it to every draft registrant seem spurious, but the
courts have rejected the proposition that prevention of fraudulent
claims is a sufficient state interest to justify a classification that
abridges fundamental rights.
265
It has been argued that it would be administratively impossi-
ble to determine whether a registrant would be qualified for selec-
tive c.o. status. Extending exemption from military service to the
selective objector would not create the problem of determining the
sincerity or religiosity of the registrant's claim but would merely
increase the problem's potential incidence. The same tests of
religiosity, the same tests of sincerity, and the same administrative
impediments to fraudulent claims would apply to selective con-
scientious objection as now apply to pacifist conscientious objec-
tion. The problem would be the same whether the claimant was a
263. Brahms, supra note 156, at 32.
264. The Selective Conscientious Objector, 26 CHRISTIANITY & CRisiS
304, 306-07 (1967). See also a somewhat different and interesting pro-
posal for alternative service, in Prickett, Draft Problems: A Bold Answer,
55 A.B.A.J. 547-49 (1969). The Marshall Commission did not object to
the administrative feasibility of assigning a selective objector to non-
combatant or alternative civilian service but was unable to see the mor-
ality of allowing a non-pacifist to avoid combat service in an "unjust" war.
Marshall Commission, supra note 119, at 50. This seems to mean that the
Commission refused to consider religion as a possible motivation for selec-
tive conscientious objection since there is no distinction between the alter-
native or non-combatant service performed by a religious pacifist and that
performed by religious selective objector.
265. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1969); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963); United States v. McFadden, 309 F. Supp.
502, 508 (N.D. Cal. 1970); United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 909
(1969). A similar argument was ignored and thereby rejected subsilentio
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), and




selective or total objector.
2 6
When processing a selective objector's claim for c.o. status, the
draft board's only new duty would be to examine the claimant's
opposition to a particular war rather than to war in general. The
selective objector's views could be expected to be less subjective
than the pacifist's since he could cite "just-war" criteria outside
himself, which had been the basis for the formation of his "moral
imperative"; 267 e.g.: Has the war been declared by a legitimate au-
thority? Have all means of conciliation been exhausted? Is the
war just in its aims, methods, and limitations? Are the rights of
civilians and prisoners of war respected? Does the conceivable
good resulting from the war's prosecution outweigh the actual or
potential evil resulting from it?268 It would be sufficient that the
applicant's reasons were not merely self-serving.
The board's function would not be to determine whether the
claimant's beliefs were right or wrong any more than it now deter-
mines whether the pacifist's beliefs are right or wrong. The board
would not judge, in the language of the Marshall Commission's
minority, "whether he was right in his assessment of the political,
military, and moral values in the situation, but simply ...
[whether] his objection was 'truly held' in the words of the Seeger
decision. '26 9 That is, whether his objection was based on values
that are "ultimate" in "his own scheme of things." Once this is
separated from his analysis of a particular war, as one commentator
has indicated, the question of the selective objector's religiosity or
sincerity is no more difficult to decide than is the question of the
pacifist's.
270
Determining sincerity and religiosity may not be easy, but draft
and appeals boards have been doing it since 1918. Furthermore,
these determinations are probably no more difficult than analyzing
conflicting testimony, determining one's state of mind, and similar
determinations that are made every day by courts and various ad-
ministrative agencies. In Sisson, Judge Wyzanski said: "The sug-
gestion that courts cannot tell a sincere from an insincere conscien-
tious objector underestimates what the judicial process performs
every day. [E] ach day courts have applied laws, criminal and civil,
266. Brahms, supra note 156, at 32; Hochstadt, supra note 256, at 15-24.
267. The Marshall Commission's holding that selective objection is a
political decision and cannot be judged in terms of moral imperatives
(see note 119 supra) seems to mean that political positions are immune
from moral judgment.
268. See text accompanying notes 84 and 90-94 supra; Arnold, supra
note 247, at 1219.
269. Marshall Commission, minority views, supra note 119, at 49.
270. Hochstadt, supra note 256, at 20.
which make sincerity the test of liability."'271 In any case, it may
often be more difficult to detect a pacifist church member's hypoc-
risy than a selective objector's integrity.
It has been suggested that the most difficult administrative
problem would be the reclassification of registrants as the nature
of the war changed. For example, a selective objector who opposed
World War II at the time of his registration may have subsequently
decided that "the free world's crusade against Hitler" was a just war
as Hitler's aims and methods became increasingly patent. Con-
versely, a number of service men who were not conscientious ob-
jectors when they enlisted or were drafted may have subsequently
become conscientious objectors as the Vietnam War has progressed.
Under present regulations, when a registrant realizes that his op-
position to war "in any form" has crystalized, he notifies his draft
board of this fact, and the board reviews his application for c.o.
status as though it were being filed at the time of registration. Un-
der the rule enunciated in United States v. Geary,27 2 this application
can be made even after induction has begun. 273 This same proce-
dure could be applied to the selective objector as well as to the
pacifist. Similarly, the procedure now used for in-service pacifists
could also be used for in-service selective objectors.274 If past ex-
perience with pacifist objectors is any indication, the number of re-
classifications would be small.
2 75
271. 297 F. Supp. at 909-10.
272. 368 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 959 (1967).
273. Id. at 150. Accord, United States v. Sampson, 3 S.S.L.R. 3056 (4th
Cir. 1970); United States v. Lonidier, 3 S.S.L.R. 3052 (9th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Delfin, 419 F.2d 226, 288 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v.
Maine, 417 F.2d 951, 953 (10th Cir. 1969); Davis v. United States, 410
F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1969); Oshatz v. United States, 404 F.2d 9, 11 (9th Cir.
1968); Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1968); United States
v. Stafford, 389 F.2d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 1968). There is an alleged conflict
between the circuits on whether a registrant's filing of a c.o. application
after his board's mailing of an induction notice requires the board to reopen
his classification. The 2d, 10th, and part of the 9th circuits require reopen-
ing. Allegedly contra, but actually distinguishable from, and reconcilable
with, the above cases: Ehlert v. United States, 422 F.2d 332 (9th Cir.), cert.
granted, 90 S. Ct. 1525 (1970); Dillon v. United States, 3 S.S.L.R. 3053 (9th
Cir. 1970); United States v. Jones, 3 S.S.L.R. 3055 (4th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Stone, 3 S.S.L.R. 3053 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Angelico,
3 S.S.L.R. 3106 (7th Cir. 1970); United States v. Seeverts, 3 S.S.L.R. 3116
(8th Cir. 1970); United States v. Swierenga, 3 S.S.L.R. 3110 (6th Cir.
1970); United States v. Banks, 413 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1969); United States
v. Jennison, 402 F.2d 51, 53 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 912 (1969);
United States v. Kroll, 400 F.2d 923, 925-26 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1069 (1969); United States v. Helm, 386 F.2d 434 (4th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 958 (1968); United States v. A1-Majied Muhammed,
364 F.2d 223, 224 (4th Cir. 1966). See also United States v. Bittinger, 422
F.2d 1032, 1034 n.6 (1969); United States v. Rundle, 413 F.2d 329, 334 n.3
(8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Stoppelman, 406 F.2d 127, 131 n.7 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 981 (1969); Note, Pre-Induction Availability of
the Right to Claim Conscientious Objector Exemption, 72 YALE L.J. 1459
(1963).
274. See note 256 supra.
275. Before 1968, service men's applications for discharge or for re-
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The claim that legal recognition of selective objection would
create great administrative problems seems to be vitiated by the
post-Seeger experience. Although it was argued that elimination
of the "Supreme Being" requirement would also create impossible
administrative problems, draft board members did not find this to
be the case. A majority of local board members thought that c.o.
classification was one of the two least difficult of the five defer-
ment classifications. Hardship, student, and occupational defer-
ments each outranked conscientious objection as one of the two
most difficult classifications. 270 The greater difficulty in classi-
fying registrants for hardship, student, and occupational deferments
is even more pronounced in the opinions of appeals board mem-
bers.277 If the elimination of the "Supreme Being" requirement
did not make c.o. classifications as difficult as hardship, student,
and occupational deferments, elimination of the "in any form" re-
quirement is unlikely to do so.
In short, the total pacifist requirement probably does not
really contribute to administrative efficiency, but the Selective
Service System apparently believes that the law does not permit
exemption for those whose conscientious objection is bottomed on
a distinction between "just" and "unjust" wars.278 Even if it were
conceded, for the sake of argument, that the distinction between
pacifists and selective objectors might contribute to some adminis-
trative efficiency, this would not be a compelling governmental in-
terest sufficient to justify abridgment of free-exercise rights279 by
refusing c.o. status to a Catholic selective objector, like Bowen or
assignment to non-combatant duty on the basis of conscientious objection
were processed by the Selective Service System. From Jan. 1, 1962 to June
1967, 2105 such applications were processed, and the applicants were re-
classified as though they were new registrants with the following results:
45.5% available for military service (I-A); 37.8% available for non-com-
batant service in the armed forces (I-A-O); 16.7% available for alternative
service (1-0). ROTHENBERG, THE DRAFT AND YOU 214 n.15 (1968).
276. Responses to the Marshall Commission's questionnaire to draft
and appeals boards, Marshall Commission, supra note 119, at 182. See
also Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Welsh v. United States, 90 S. Ct.
1792, 1811 n.19 (1970).
277. Marshall Commission, supra note 119, at 116, 179.
278. HERSHEY, LEGAL ASPECTS OF SELECTivE SERVIcE 13-16 (1969) [herein-
after cited as HERSHEY].
279. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1969); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963); United States v. McFadden, 309 F. Supp.
502, 507 (N.D. Cal. 1969); United States v. Bowen, 2 S.S.L.R. 3421, 3422
n.6 (N.D. Cal. 1969). United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), would
not seem to vitiate this conclusion since O'Brien's asserted right (non-
verbal and non-written free expression) was merely "penumbral" at most
and since the prohibition against the burning of draft cards was only an
"incidental restriction" on this alleged freedom. 391 U.S. at 377.
McFadden, who conscientiously believes that the Vietnam War is an
"unjust" war.28 0
The fifth argument against exempting the selective objector
from military service is that it would seriously impair the armed
forces' ability to fill their ranks with the necessary number of men
trained and ready for combat. This argument is vitiated by the
fact that both deliveries for induction and actual inductions virtu-
ally always exceed the calls for induction. 28' In any case, both the
Marshall Commission and the Selective Service System admit that
conscientious objectors represent one of the smallest groups in the
System.2 2 Of the 40,303,654 registrants living on June 30, 1970,285
only 39,930 (0.099%) had applied for, were, or previously had been
classified as 1-0 and thus exempted from military service.
2 4 Of
the 22,217,000 within the age bracket for induction, only 28,187
(0.127%) were classified as 1-0 or I-W.285 In short, conscientious
objectors are only a small fraction of one percent of the armed
forces' pool of potential manpower.
Admittedly, these I-Os and I-Ws qualified under the "in any
form" requirement so that one might argue that these statistics are
not a good index of how many conscientious objectors there would
be if this requirement were eliminated. The same argument was
used with respect to elimination of the "Supreme Being" require-
ment, but experience has proved the argument to be without merit.
The number of living registrants increased from 29,683,392 on De-
280. Under the free exercise clause, it is irrelevant that their belief
may be mistaken. See text accompanying notes 88 and 89 supra. Nor is it
relevant that they might never be sent to Vietnam since they believe that
their assignment to duty elsewhere amounts to participating in an "unjust"
war by freeing another serviceman to fight in Vietnam and that there is
no distinction between principals and accomplices in "mortal sin." For an
explanation of this Catholic teaching, see United States v. Berg, 310 F.
Supp. 1157, 1160 (1970). Moreover, once they are in the armed service and
ordered to Vietnam, the courts will not review military orders. Orloff v.
Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1953); Pitcher v. Laird, 421 F.2d 1272, 1278
(5th Cir. 1970); Schultz v. Clifford, 417 F.2d 775, 776 (8th Cir. 1969); Ham-
mond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir. 1968); Luftig v. McNamara,
252 F. Supp. 819 (D. D.C. 1966), alfd, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 945 (1967). See also Craycroft v. Ferrall, 408 F.2d 587, 595-99
(9th Cir. 1969).
281. Table of calls, deliveries, and inductions, 1949-70, HERSHEY,
SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF SELECTIVE SERVICE FOR THE PERIOD
JULY 1 To DECEMBER 31, 1969 at 22 (1970).
282. HERSHEY, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF SELECTIVE
SERVICE FOR THE PERIOD JULY 1 TO DECEMBER 31, 1968, at 9 (1969); Marshall
Commission, supra note 119, at 48.
283. Percentages are the author's computations from data supplied by
the National Headquarters of the Selective Service System and to be in-
cluded in Tables 1 and 4 of TARR, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR
OF SELECTIVE SERVICE FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1 TO JUNE 30, 1970 (in press)
[hereinafter cited as TARR].
284. This figure includes 9,071 who had applied for 1-0 but had not
yet been examined. Id.
285. This figure is broken down as follows: I-0=18,998 (of which 9,927
had been examined and qualified, and 9,071 had applied for 1-0 but had
not yet been examined); I-W=9,189 (alternative civilian service). Id.
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cember 31, 1964, two months before Seeger, to 40,303,654 on June 30,
1970, more than five years after Seeger. During the same period,
the number of I-Os and I-Ws increased from 18,802 (0.063%) to
39,930 (0.099%).2s 6 One would not expect a more substantial in-
crease in conscientious-objector classifications if selective objection
were permitted. Moreover, British experience with selective objec-
tion confirms that giving legal recognition to selective objectors
does not greatly increase the proportion of conscientious objectors
and that the number of objectors declines sharply as the danger to
national security increases.
2 7
Even if the number of conscientious objectors had a less minor
statistical relationship to the over-all problem of military man-
power procurement, the Government would still be required to
show that the armed forces' manpower requirements could not be
met without drafting the selective objector, i.e., that there are no
alternative means without infringing first amendment rights. As
with jury-service laws, 28 the Selective Service Act authorizes nu-
merous deferments and exemptions. Thirty-five percent of those
liable for service on June 30, 1970 were deferred for other than
physical, mental, or moral reasons. This included 1,699,277 college
students and 4,160,725 fatherhood and/or hardship deferments. 28 9
Although the different birth rates during the Depression and World
War II suggest otherwise, becoming a father, even of an unborn
child, is deemed to be a changed condition "over which the regis-
trant has no control" so that he can apply for reclassification from
I-A to III-A, which carries a deferment that usually amounts to an
exemption for all practical purposes. Presumably, the same reason-
ing applies equally well to the registrant's control over the bestowal
of divine grace in so far as the conscientious objector is con-
cerned.
2 90
286. Id., Table 1; previously unpublished data for 1964 supplied by the
Legislative and Liaison Division of the Selective Service System.
287. Comment, The Conscientious Objector and the First Amendment:
There but for the Grace of God, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 79, 104 (1966); Hoch-
stadt, supra note 256, at 56-58. American experience also indicates that the
number of objectors declines in time of national emergency. Id. at 59; 1
SELECTIVE SERVICE MONOGRAPH No. 11 at 4, 53, 152-53 (1950). If opposition
to a war increased so much that the number of selective objectors became
statistically significant, presumably this wide-spread religious and ethical
questioning of American involvement in that war would be reflected in the
political branches of the Government.
288. See note 227, supra.
289. See TAI, supra note 283.
290. This reasoning has been tacitly applied to the pacifist but not to the
selective objector. See text accompanying notes 273 and 274, supra; HER-
SHEY, supra note 278, at 17-18, 35-42. See also 32 C.F.R. 1622.30(c) (1)
(1970).
Of the 22,217,000 registrants liable for service on June 30, 1970,
only 16.5 percent were then in, or reserved for service, and this in-
cluded 9,189 then in alternative service (I-W). Only another 16.2
percent had completed their service. 2 1 Of the 13,617,734 deferred
registrants, 12.5 percent were deferred as college students, 30.6 per-
cent were deferred on grounds of fatherhood or dependency hard-
ship, and 42.6 percent were deferred for physical or mental rea-
sons.292 The physical and mental requirements seem to fluctuate
widely with changing needs for manpower. Early in 1961, for ex-
ample, rejections ran up to 78 percent but fell to a mere 14 percent
in late 1961.291 In many cases, these deferments amount to exemp-
tions without any alternative civilian-work requirement. One ob-
vious source of manpower is the volunteer whom the armed serv-
ices reject as not meeting the high physical and mental standards
set for combat duty. During the first year of "Project 100,000", ap-
proximately one-half of the participants were found to have previ-
ously sought unsuccessfully to enlist in one of the services.
29 4
Another obvious source for military manpower is the in-
creased enlistments and re-enlistments induced by higher pay and
other incentives. Economic rather than military considerations
seem to have motivated conscription in preference to a volunteer
army. The cost of training a draftee, however, suggests that a high
rate of re-enlistment might be economical in the long run, at least
when the United States is not involved in an all-out war.
295 Still
another source of military manpower is the draftee who is now
performing duties that could be performed equally well or better by
civilian employees or by volunteer or conscripted service women.
296
The documents published by the Government's own Printing Office
seem to vitiate any serious claims that there are no alternative
means of meeting the Government's needs for military manpower
291. TARR, supra note 283, Table 4.
292. Id., Table 1.
293. CHAPMAN, THE WRONG MAN IN UNIFORM 23, 29-30 (1967) [herein-
after cited as CHAPMAN]; WALTON, THE WASTED GENERATION 9-26, 37-49,
75-84 (1965).
294. Message of President Johnson to Congress, 113 Cong. Rec. 5404,
5405-06, 5576, 5577-78 (Mar. 6, 1967) [hereinafter cited as JOHNSON]; RE
VIEW OF THE ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATION OF THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYS-
TEM, Hearings before the House Committee on Armed Forces, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess., 9679, 9707, 9933-38, 9945, 9959-64 (1966) [hereinafter cited as RE-
VIEW]; Marshall Commission, supra note 119, at 57-59; PRESIDENT'S TASK
FORCE REPORT ON MANPOWER CONSERVATION, ONE-THIRD OF A NATION (1964);
Hochstadt, supra note 256, at 44-45; NATIONAL MANPOWER COUNCIL, GOVERN-
MENT AND MANPOWER, 370-98 passim (1964).
295. JOHNSON, supra note 294, 113 CONG. REC. at 5405, 5477; REVIEW,
supra note 294, at 9938-40, 9953-59; Proposed Changes In The Selective
Service System, 46 CONG. DIG. 131-60 (May, 1967); CHAPMAN, supra note
293, at 103-28; Friedman, An Al-Volunteer Army, N.Y. Times, May 14, 1967,
p. 23 (Magazine); WiY THE DRAFT? THE CASE FOR A VOLUNTEER ARMY
(Miller ed. 1968).
296. JOHNSON, supra note 294, 113 CONG. REC. at 5405, 5477; Marshall
Commission, supra note 119, at 11; REVIEW, supra note 294, at 9940; Hoch-
stadt, supra note 256, at 44-45.
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without drafting the selective objector.29
Moreover, the pacifist puts a greater burden on the Govern-
ment's manpower needs than the selective objector does. For, while
the pacifist is not available for combat duty, the selective objector
is available for military duty at another time and/or in another
place. If the country's martial efforts depend on compelling selec-
tive objectors to participate in a war that ends in nothing for them
but a fear of spiritual condemnation, the country's military de-
fenses are indeed precarious.298 Experience with conscientious
objectors shows that their presence in the armed forces, or in
prison, is a greater burden on the war effort than any theoretical
manpower advantage gained by their conscription. They simply
will not fight, they create morale problems, and it requires men to
guard them in prison.
299
Since there are alternative means of procuring military man-
power without abridging the selective objector's free-exercise
rights, there is no compelling governmental interest justifying in-
vidious discrimination against the selective objector. Consequently,
the Selective Service Act's section 6 (j), which exempts only paci-
fists, violates equal protection as well as the first amendment.
297. See, e.g., reports and documents cited in note 294 supra; Presi-
dent Johnson's Message to Congress on March 6, 1967:
Because of this population increase, many more men . . . are
available for military duty than are required.
A decade ago, about 70 percent of the group eligible for duty
had to serve with the Armed Forces to meet our military manpower
needs.
Today, the need is for less than 50 percent, and only about a
third or less of this number must be involuntarily inducted-even
under the conditions of war. When the firing stops .... the re-
quirements will be for fewer still.
[T]he numbers of men needed are relatively small in relation
to the numbers available.
JOHNSON, supra note 294, 113 CONG. Rac. at 5404, 5476. The President
continued:
Almost 2 million young men-and soon many more-reach age
19 each year. The foreseeable requirement is to draft only 100,000
to 300,000 of them annually ....
Past procedures have, in effect, reduced the size of the available
manpower pool by deferring men out of it.
Id. at 5406, 5478. See also the testimony of Melvin Laird, Secretary of De-
fense, to the effect that less than 30 per cent of the qualified persons in the
draftable age group will be drafted. RANDOM SELECTION SYSTEM FOR
INDUCTON INTO THE ARMED FORCES, Hearing before the Senate Committee
on Armed Services, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (Nov. 14, 1969).
298. See Justices' Black and Douglas concurring opinion in West Va. Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 644 (1943).
299. SIBLEY & WARDLAW, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS IN PRISON 1940-
1945 at 1-68 (1945).
3. Equal Protection of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause
When a law that affects primary rights draws a distinction be-
tween classes, that distinction must be supported by a compelling
state interest.3°0 Because the selective objector is deprived of his
free-exercise rights by the classification, this demonstrated under-
inclusiveness of the Selective Service Act's section 6 (j) establishes
the violation of equal protection. And, if a statute violates equal
protection, it also violates the fifth amendment's due process
clause.30 1 Since some conscientious objectors are exempted from
military service, the selective objector may argue that his scruples
are entitled to protection equal to that given to the pacifist's scru-
ples. Since the Act protects the free-exercise only of pacifist re-
ligions, it establishes a discriminatory classification in violation of
the fifth amendment's due process clause.
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania was probably correct in pointing out that the first
amendment's free exercise clause applies to religion and not to non-
religion so that this clause can not be the basis for claiming a con-
stitutional right to secular conscientious objection 0 2 The court did
not come to grips, however, with the establishment-clause argument
and confused it with the free-exercise argument.303 Furthermore,
the court was probably mistaken in holding that the statutory ex-
clusion of secular conscientious objection is a permissible classifica-
tion.314 For, although the free exercise clause does not apply to
non-religion, the establishment and due process clauses preclude
invidious discrimination against the non-religious objector. With-
out a showing that a particular secular objector is as genuinely and
profoundly governed by his conscience as the religious objector, that
secular objector presumably would have no standing to assert the
underinclusiveness of section 6 (j) of the Act. If the secular objec-
tor makes such a showing, however, as Sisson did,30 5 then he would
seem to have standing to make the same assertion as Sisson. This
is also what Sisson did.3° 6 Since Negre °7 and Gillette3 08 are secu-
lar objectors, presumably the Supreme Court will require them to
make such a showing. Their records in the lower courts, however,
300. United States v. McFadden, 309 F. Supp. 502, 507 (N.D. Cal.
1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 403, 406 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
301. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969); Schneider v.
Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
302. United States v. Neamand, 302 F. Supp. 1296, 1306 (M.D. Pa. 1969).
303. Id. at 1305-06.
304. Id. at 1306.
305. 297 F. Supp. at 905, 909. This presumably is included in the re-
quirement for sincerity. See text accompanying notes 60 and 61 supra.
306. 297 F. Supp. at 910.
307. Negre v. Larsen, 418 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1969).
308. United States v. Gillette, 420 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1970).
The Conscientious Objector
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
are not at all clear on this point.
If the conscientious-objector exemption from military service
were withdrawn from all objectors,309 the conscientious objector
would have to base his claim on the free exercise clause and, pre-
sumably, only a religious objector could successfully do thisA10
Once one religious objector, such as a Quaker, establishes his free-
exercise right to exemption, however, it appears that the right
would have to be extended to other sincere religious objectors, such
as the just-war selective objector. A classification that penalizes
the exercise of such a fundamental right as religion violates equal
protection. 3 n1 Finally, if the religious objector's right to exemption
is established either as a constitutional or statutory right, the secu-
lar objector can assert underinclusiveness on equal protection
grounds.
IV. CONCLUSION: ALTERNATIVE BASES
The equal-protection argument and the first amendment's es-
tablishment clause can be used to vindicate the right of selective
pacifism only as long as total pacifism enjoys statutory protection.
If the law were to recognize no right of conscientious objection at
all, the conscientious objector, whether total or selective, would
have to fall back on the free exercise clause or some alternative
basis. While the free-exercise claim is doubtless the strongest one,
there may be policy reasons for vindicating the right on another
ground. The surest way to destroy both religion and religious
freedom is to secularize religion. In order to avoid making invidi-
ous distinctions between strong personal beliefs that defy defini-
tion or understanding, Seeger, Welsh, and Sisson have secularized
"religious training and belief" and, thereby, demeaned its impor-
tance.31 2 This, in turn, leads to subjecting religion to secular laws
309. One commentator has argued that, even if conscientious objection
is upheld on statutory grounds (see text accompanying notes 110-117
supra), Congress cannot eliminate the conscientious-objector exemption
entirely. Citing Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (which held that
repeal of an open-housing law violated the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause), this commentator argues by analogy that, once Congress
has allowed the free exercise of religion by granting the exemption, repeal
of the grant would violate the first and fifth amendments. Comment,
Selective Service Law: The Selective Conscientious Objector, 55 IA. L. Rv.
288, 305 n.90 (1969).
310. But see text accompanying notes 240 and 241 supra.
311. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). The court held a
state requirement of a year's residence in the state to qualify for welfare
unconstitutional on the ground that this classification penalized the right to
travel. While the free-exercise right is an express first-amendment right,
the right to travel is a penumbral right at best.
312. See text accompanying notes 21-54 supra. Judge Wyzanski found
and makes its free-exercise dependent on judicial balancing. Con-
sequently, there may be real merit in vindicating the conscientious
objector's right to exemption from military service on the basis of
Justice Douglas' "penumbra,"' 13 or former Justice Goldberg's ninth-
amendment argument,s 14 or Justice Harlan's "ordered liberty."315
Two commentators suggest that the conscientious objector's
right to exemption from military service might be based on "the
right not to kill."3 10  As they point out, although not all con-
scientious belief is religion in the traditional sense, all religion is
rooted in conscience.3 17 Since this is true and since the taking of
human life is the most serious violation of conscience that society
can demand from the citizen,315 the right "not to kill" could be
found to fall within the "penumbras formed by emanations"' 1 9
from the free exercise clause, the protection of life in the fifth
amendment's due process clause, the ninth amendment's unenum-
erated rights, and the thirteenth amendment's prohibition against
involuntary servitude. Although the courts have rejected the ar-
gument that either military conscription or compulsory alternative
civilian service constitutes involuntary servitude,3 20 the thirteenth
Sisson's belief about the Vietnam War to be a "religion" in that it occu-
pied a place in Sisson's scheme of things equivalent to that occupied by
pacifism in the pacifist objector's scale of values. Since Judge Wyzanski
found Sisson's belief to be "religious," he argued that forcing Sisson to
fight in the Vietnam War violated Sisson's right to "free exercise" under
the first amendment. United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 904-05,
909-10 (1969). If he had found Sisson's belief not to be "religious," the
claim would have to have been settled under the establishment and/or
due process clauses. See notes 241 and 242 supra. Two commentators
point out that
either we will denigrate the meaning of religion to the point where
it becomes equivalent to a strongly held objection to a particular
government policy, or we will be making invidious distinctions
among . . . strong personal beliefs . . . which will be virtually im-
possible to define or understand.
Redlich and Feinberg, Individual Conscience and the Selective Conscien-
tious Objector: The Right Not to Kill, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 875, 887 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Redlich & Feinberg]. See note 118 supra.
313. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-85 (1965) (holding that
the State's Anti-Contraception Law violated the fourteenth amendment's
due process clause by intruding into the area of marital privacy that is
within the penumbra of specific constitutional guarantees of amendments I
(assembly), III (quartering), IV (search & seizure), V (self-incrimination),
and IX (unenumerated rights) ).
314. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-99 (1965) (arguing that
marital privacy is one of the ninth amendment's residual rights and, conse-
quently, is protected by the due process provisions of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments).
315. Id. at 496-502 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)
and arguing that marital privacy is one of the basic values "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" and should not be dependent upon incorporating
the letter or the penumbra of the bill of rights into the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause).
316. Redlich & Feinberg, supra note 312, at 888.
317. Id. at 891.
318. Id.
319. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
320. Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918); United States v.
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amendment also outlaws the badges and incidents of slavery.
3 21 If
racially segregated housing and cemeteries are indicia of slavery.3
2
surely the imposition of unconscionable duties against the subject's
will, i.e., compelling a conscientious objector to kill another human
being, is also a mark of slavery. If this argument is valid, it applies
not only to direct killing as a combatant but also to indirect killing
as a non-combatant member of the armed forces,323 although not
to alternative civilian service. And, the "right not to kill" is pat-
ently quite as essential to free exercise of religion and to freedom
from the indicia of slavery as the "right of association"3 24 is to free-
dom of speech and assembly.
The conscientious objector's right to exemption from military
service might also be based on former Justice Goldberg's ninth
amendment argument.325 Even if the Court takes the narrower
Leavy, 422 F.2d 1155, 1157-58 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 1524
(1970); United States v. Crocker, 420 F.2d 307, 309 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 90 S. Ct. 1240 (1970); O'Connor v. United States, 415 F.2d 1110, 1111
(9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 1002 (1970); United States v. Fallon,
407 F.2d 621, 624 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 908 (1969); Ashton v.
United States, 404 F.2d 95, 96 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 960
(1969); United States v. Chandler, 403 F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1968); United
States v. Holmes, 387 F.2d 781, 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 936
(1968); Kramer v. United States, 147 F.2d 756, 759 (6th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 324 U.S. 878 (1945); United States v. St. Clair, 291 F. Supp. 122, 124
(S.D. N.Y. 1968). For a view rejecting Arver as binding authority see Bern-
stein, Conscription and the Constitution, 53 A.B.A.J. 708 (1967).
321. See Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439-43 (1968); Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (dictum); United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp.
1305, 1313 (D. Md. 1969); Contract Buyers League v. F. & F. Investment
Co., 300 F. Supp. 210, 214-15 (N.D. Ill. 1969), aff'd sub nom. Baker v. F. & F.
Investment Co., 420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1970), U.S. appeal pending, 38
U.S.L.W. 3511 (U.S. June 23, 1970) (No. 1653); Ranjel v. Lansing, 293 F.
Supp. 301, 309-12 (W.D. Mich.), rev'd on other grounds, 417 F.2d 321
(6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 1105 (1970).
322. See cases cited note 321 supra.
323. See United States v. Berg, 310 F. Supp. 1157, 1160 (1970), for an
explanation of the Catholic teaching that makes no distinction between
principals and accomplices in "mortal sin."
324. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430-31 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 484-87 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61
(1958); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 244-46 (1957).
325. See note 314 supra. One commentator suggests three categories of
rights: (1) Absolute rights, such as first-amendment rights, which he would
exempt from judicial balancing; (2) Preferred rights, which would be sub-
ject to the balancing test (see text accompanying notes 218-229, 242-299
supra) and which would include the ninth amendment's unenumerated
rights, such as privacy and association, that are adjacent to or analogous to
enumerated rights and, therefore, by their nature comparable to enumerated
rights; (3) Substantive due-process rights, which would be subject to
the more flexible test of a reasonable relation of the means to a valid
legislative end and which would include rights limited by social and
economic legislation of the sort involved in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905); Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights. . . Retained by the People"?
view that the ninth amendment is not an independent source of
rights, 326 the Court could still find that the "right not to kill" is
one of the ninth amendment's unenumerated rights since it is adja-
cent and analogous to the free exercise of religion and to freedom
from the indicia of slavery. The mere fact that the right not to kill
is not expressly enumerated does not deny or disparage that right.
The ninth amendment's clear purpose is to preclude a narrow in-
terpretation of enumerated rights and to preclude them from being
an exclusive catalog of rights.3 27 James Madison, the amendment's
author, was particularly concerned about the rights of conscience,
and there is evidence that he may have proposed the amendment to
meet precisely this problem among others
2 1
The right not to kill could also be vindicated under the fifth
amendment's due process clause as a right essential to Justice Har-
lan's "ordered liberty."3 29 Certainly, this right is quite as funda-
mental to ordered liberty as is the right to marry, 330 or to marital
intimacy,3 3 1 or to travel,3 32 or to conduct and attend church-related
schools,333 or to teach and learn a foreign language,3 34 all of which
37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 787, 810-12 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Redlich]. Con-
curring in Griswold, Justice White placed the right to use contraceptives
in the third category and found that the anti-contraception law could not
meet the test of substantive due process since the end (discouraging illicit
or promiscuous extra-marital sex relations) has no reasonable relation to
the means (prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married couples). 381
U.S. at 505-07.
326. Dunbar, James Madison and the Ninth Amendment, 42 VA. L. REV.
627 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Dunbar]; Emerson, Nine Justices in Search
of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REV. 219 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Emerson];
Kelley, The Uncertain Renaissance of the Ninth Amendment, 33 U. Cm.
L. REV. 814, 815, 835-36 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Kelley]; Rogge, Un-
enumerated Rights, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 787 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
Rogge]. For an exposition of the broader view that the ninth amendment
is an independent source of rights, see PATTrERSON, THE FOnGOTTEN NINTH
AMENDMENT 6-8, 19-26 (1955) [hereinafter cited as PATTERSON]; Abrams,
What Are the Rights Guaranteed by the Ninth Amendment? 53 A.B.A.J.
1033, 1038 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Abrams]; Kelsey, The Ninth Amend-
ment of the Federal Constitution, 11 IND. L.J. 30D (1936) [hereinafter cited
as Kelsey]; Kutner, The Neglected Ninth Amendment: 'Other Rights' Re-
tained by the People, 51 MARQ. L. REV. 121 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Kutner]. For a history of the framing of the ninth amendment, see Call,
Federalism and the Ninth Amendment, 64 DIcK. L. REV. 121 (1960). Perhaps
the best article on the ninth amendment is Van Loan, Natural Rights and
the Ninth Amendment, 48 BosToN U.L. REV. 1 (1968).
327. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488-90 (1965) (concurring
opinion); 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES 626-27, 651 (5th ed. 1891); Kelley, supra
note 326, at 820-25, 835. Kelsey, supra note 326, at 323; Kutner, supra note
326, at 125.
328. 5 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 271-72 (Hunt ed. 1904); Brant, 1
JAMES MADISON 234-50, esp. 243 (1941); Kutner, supra note 326, at 125.
329. See note 315 supra. See also Dunbar, supra note 326, at 640;
Emerson, supra note 326, at 227-28; Rogge, supra note 326, at 827.
330. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
331. See note 315 supra.
332. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1964); Kent
v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 127-29 (1958). See also note 311 supra.
333. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
334. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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are unenumerated rights.33  Basing the conscientious objector's
right to exemption from military service on substantive due proc-
ess grounds, however, presents the danger of subjecting the right to
the more flexible test for substantive due process rights,3 6 on the
one hand, and the danger of returning to an open-ended concept of
substantive due process on the other.33 7 Vindicating the conscien-
tious objector's right as a penumbral or ninth-amendment right,
however, would allow it to be governed by the stricter and less
flexible "balancing test," would allow it to be applied to pacifists
and selective objectors alike whether secular or religious, would
allow this to be done without a diluted definition of religion that
elevates mere personal conviction to the level of religion,338 and
would reaffirm that "freedom to differ is not limited to things that
do not matter much ... [but extends] to things that touch the
heart of the existing order.
33 9
335. Redlich favors establishing such rights as ninth-amendment
rights, Redlich, supra note 325, at 808, in order to exempt them from the
more flexible test applied to substantive due process rights, id. at 809, 810,
812, as explained in note 325 supra. See also Ratner, The Function of the
Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1048, 1068-71 (1968).
336. See notes 325 and 335 supra.
337. See Justice Black's dissent in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 511-27 (1965); Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair,
1965 Sup. CT. REV. 119, 149-55.
338. Redlich & Feinberg, supra note 312, at 892, 900.
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